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Human resources management

Staffing of field missions, including the use of 300 and 100 series appointments

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/266, section X, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report on the reappointment of mission staff who have reached the four-year limit under 300 series appointments of limited duration by 31 December 2004 or later, and to submit proposals for which functions are relevant for reappointment under 100 series contracts for consideration and action by the Assembly at the second part of its resumed fifty-ninth session.

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 58/296, decided to suspend the application of the four-year maximum limit for appointments of limited duration under the 300 series of staff rules in peacekeeping operations until 31 December 2004 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the use of 300 series contracts for meeting current and future human resources requirements for peacekeeping missions. The comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on the staffing of field missions, including the use of 300 and 100 series appointments,[1] outlined the current international context under which peacekeeping operations are deployed and the changing expectations of Member States and legislative bodies of the role of peacekeeping. In that report the Secretary-General also proposed measures to strengthen the human resources management of peacekeeping operations, enabling a better response to changing operational requirements and circumstances, and in that connection sought the approval of the Assembly to use the 100 series appointment for the recruitment of staff in field missions for six months or longer in cases where there is a continuing requirement.

2. Having considered the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, in section X of resolution 59/266, decided to continue to suspend the application of the four-year maximum limit for appointments of limited duration under the 300 series of the Staff Rules in peacekeeping operations until 30 June 2005. In the same section, the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to reappoint under the 100 series of the Staff Rules those mission staff whose service under 300-series contracts had reached the four-year limit by 31 December 2004, pending a decision by the Assembly, provided that their functions had been reviewed and found necessary and that their performance record had been confirmed as fully satisfactory. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to report on those staff who were reappointed from 300 to 100 series contracts after reaching the four-year limit by 31 December 2004 or later, and to submit proposals for which functions are relevant for reappointment under the 100 series.

3. The present report provides the information requested on the mission staff reappointed from 300 to 100 series contracts after reaching the four-year limit of their 300 series contract. The report also proposes to use the 100 series contract for staff members performing functions for which there is a continuing need and to continue to use the 300 series contract for the appointment of staff performing short-term functions of a duration of less than one year.

II. Reappointment of staff from 300 to 100 series contracts

4. By 30 June 2005, a total of 346 international staff will have reached, or exceeded, four years of service under 300 series appointments of limited duration. These 346 staff members were considered for reappointment under a 100 series contract in accordance with the criteria set out in section X, paragraph 2, of resolution 59/266, that is, that their functions had been reviewed and found necessary and that their performance had been confirmed as fully satisfactory.

[1] A/59/291.

5. As a result of this review, 287 staff members met the criteria for reappointment from 300 to 100 series contracts set out in resolution 59/266. Forty-eight staff members did not meet this criteria, due either to the anticipated downsizing or to closure of the mission in which they were serving. These 48 staff members remain employed under a 300 series contract. In addition, four staff who will reach mandatory age of separation by 30 June 2005 did not meet the criteria for reappointment, as there was no expectation of their continued service. The reappointment of five staff members whose performance record had not been confirmed as fully satisfactory had not been approved. The recommendation for reappointment of two staff members is still pending consideration.

6. A breakdown of the number of staff who met the criteria for reappointment from a 300 to a 100 series contract, as well as those who did not, is provided in table 1 in the annex to the present report. Table 2, also in the annex, provides a breakdown of staff who met the criteria for reappointment from 300 to 100 series by functions performed. It may be noted that in some cases the functions being performed by staff reappointed under 100 series contracts are distinct to the mandate of a specific mission and are not necessarily skills that can be easily transferred to other missions. Nevertheless, that particular mission has a continuing need for the services of these staff beyond the four-year limit provided for under the 300 series contract. For example, the expertise of a Municipal Officer in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) carrying out governance functions would not be needed in other missions; UNMIK, however, has a continuing requirement for the services of a Municipal Officer beyond four years. In the light of this continuing need, and after confirmation that a staff member's performance record had been at least fully satisfactory, the staff member is considered eligible for reappointment from a 300 to a 100 series contract limited to service with that specific mission.

III. Proposed functions

7. The General Assembly in its resolution 59/266, requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals for which functions are relevant for reappointment under the 100 series of the Staff Rules. In considering which functions are relevant for appointment under a 100 series contract, the Department was mindful of the intended purpose of the 100 and 300 series appointments and the nature of the functions performed. It may be recalled that the 100 series contract is intended for the employment of staff of the Secretariat appointed by, or on behalf of, the Secretary-General for a period of one year or more, or whose appointments for a lesser period are extended to one year or more, to carry out the substantive programmes and to perform the support and service functions which are mandated by the Charter of the United Nations or by the legislative bodies of the Organization as the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General.[2] The 300 series appointment of limited duration is intended for activities of a limited duration not expected to exceed three years, including peacekeeping and peacemaking, humanitarian, technical cooperation and emergency operations.

[2] ST/SGB/177, para. 3.

8. As described in the comprehensive report on the staffing of field missions,[1] demands for peacekeeping missions have increased while at the same time mission mandates have grown more complex involving a variety of tasks, including political, governance, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law and security and protection, in addition to the traditional peacekeeping functions. Missions often operate in complex post-conflict situations, contributing to the development or rebuilding of governance and social structures. As a result, missions are more likely to have a duration of longer than three years. The environment in which peacekeeping missions operate is also becoming more dangerous. The new peacekeeping model requires that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations be able to:

(a) Attract, recruit and develop highly-skilled and experienced staff who are able to effectively operate in difficult mission environments;

(b) Retain these staff, as missions are likely to have a duration of longer than three years;

(c) Adequately compensate staff for the dangerous and difficult conditions under which they serve.

9. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations proposes that the 100 series appointment be used as the contractual instrument for the employment of staff performing functions that are not, by their nature, temporary or limited in duration, and for which the Department has a continuing need for one year or longer, in line with ST/SGB/177. The 300 series appointment of limited duration would be used as the contractual instrument for the employment of staff performing functions that are temporary in nature, with a limited duration of under one year. These have been identified as electoral assistance, border monitoring and short-term projects.

10. The use of 100 series appointments for functions of a continuing nature would also help to harmonize, to an extent, the conditions of service between different groups of staff in field missions and to promote the harmonization of conditions of service of Secretariat field staff with field staff of the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system, thereby strengthening the ability to recruit and retain high quality peacekeeping personnel.

IV. Conclusion

11. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to face increasing demands for complex peacekeeping operations as well as increasing expectations that it improve its capacity to effectively plan and manage peace operations and respond quickly and effectively to any Security Council mandate. To respond to these demands, the Department must have the capacity to rapidly deploy experienced, trained and capable civilian peacekeepers in adequate numbers to support peacekeeping operations. Creating this capacity requires that the Organization be able to: attract high calibre candidates, invest in developing high-performing civilian staff, in particular for leadership and management positions, and retain these staff. In order to both recruit and retain such staff, competitive conditions of service and contractual arrangements are necessary. **Accordingly, the Secretary-General seeks the agreement of the General Assembly to use the 100 series contract for staff members performing functions for which there is a continuing need and to continue to use the 300 series contract for the appointment of staff performing short-term functions having a duration of less**

than one year. Pending the consideration of this proposal by the General Assembly, the Secretariat also seeks approval to continue the practice of reappointing serving staff under 100 series contracts, on a case-by-case basis, after they reach the maximum period of service permitted under a 300 series appointment of limited duration, subject to the criteria set out in section X, paragraph 2, of resolution 59/266, that is, a continuing need for their services and a fully satisfactory performance record.

Annex

Table 1
Breakdown of staff reviewed for reappointment from 300 to 100 series appointments

	Number of staff reappointed from 300 to 100 series			*Number of staff not reappointed from 300 to 100 series*			
Mission[a]	*Professional*	*Field Service*	*Subtotal*	*Professional*	*Field Service*	*Subtotal*	*Total*
BONUCA	1	1	**2**	—	—	**0**	**2**
MINURSO	1	7	**8**	—	—	**0**	**8**
MINUSTAH	13	1	**14**	—	—	**0**	**14**
MONUC	23	19	**42**	1	1	**2**	**44**
UNOB	3	4	**7**	—	—	**0**	**7**
UNOCI	3	9	**12**	—	—	**0**	**12**
OSRSG-GLR	—	—	**0**	1	—	**1**	**1**
UNAMA	1	2	**3**	1	1	**2**	**5**
UNAMI	—	—	**0**	1	—	**1**	**1**
UNMIS	3	1	**4**	—	—	**0**	**4**
UNAMSIL	2	3	**5**	1	—	**1**	**6**
UNMEE	6	10	**16**	1	—	**1**	**17**
UNMIK	76	81	**157**	4	5	**9**	**166**
UNMIL	6	7	**13**	—	—	**0**	**13**
UNMISET	—	—	**0**	12	30	**42**	**42**
UNOGBIS	1	—	**1**	—	—	**0**	**1**
UNOMIG	1	2	**3**	—	—	**0**	**3**
Total	**140**	**147**	**287**	**22**	**37**	**59**	**346**

[a] United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General-Great Lakes region, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

Table 2
Breakdown of staff reappointed from 300 to 100 series appointments by function and mission[a]

Functions	*BONUCA*	*MINURSO*	*MINUSTAH*	*MONUC*	*UNOB*	*UNOCI*	*OSRSG-GLR*	*UNAMA*	*UNAMI*	*UNMIS*	*UNAMSIL*	*UNMEE*	*UNMIK*	*UNMIL*	*UNMISET*	*UNOGBIS*	*UNOMIG*	*Total*
Total	**2**	**8**	**14**	**42**	**7**	**12**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**4**	**5**	**16**	**157**	**13**	**0**	**1**	**3**	**287**
Administrative Officer/Assistant	—	—	—	9	3	—	—	1	—	1	1	1	30	2	—	—	—	48
Air Operations Officer/Assistant	—	1	—	3	—	2	—	—	—	1	—	2	1	1	—	—	—	11
Civil Affairs Officer	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	40	1	—	—	—	43
Communications Assistant	—	—		3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	4
Contracts Management Officer/Assistant	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2
Coordinator	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Court Recorder	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	3
Emergency Planning Officer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Engineer	—	—	—	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	1	11
Expert (Veterinary)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Finance and Budget Officer/Assistant	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	5	1	—	—	—	10
Generator Mechanic	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	4
Human Rights Officer	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Information Officer	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Information Technology Officer	—	1	2	3	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	6	1	—	—	—	16
Interpreter	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	23	—	—	—	—	23
Judicial Affairs Officer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	6
Legal Officer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—	4
Logistics Officer/Assistant	—	—	4	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	13
Medical Officer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Movement Control Officer	—	1	—	3	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	—	10
Municipal Officer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Personnel Officer/Assistant	—	1	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	6

Functions	*BONUCA*	*MINURSO*	*MINUSTAH*	*MONUC*	*UNOB*	*UNOCI*	*OSRSG-GLR*	*UNAMA*	*UNAMI*	*UNMIS*	*UNAMSIL*	*UNMEE*	*UNMIK*	*UNMIL*	*UNMISET*	*UNOGBIS*	*UNOMIG*	*Total*
Political Affairs Officer	—	—	—	3	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	4	2	—	—	—	—	**11**
Procurement Officer/Assistant	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**1**
Radio Technician		1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	**4**
Secretary	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	**3**
Security Officer	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	8	2	—	—	2	**16**
Special Assistant	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	**2**
Staff Counsellor	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**1**
Supply Officer/Assistant	—	—	1	2	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	6	—	—	—	—	**13**
Transport Officer/Assistant	—	1	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	**9**
Vehicle Mechanic	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	**4**

[a] United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General-Great Lakes region, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

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Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Status of the civilian rapid deployment roster

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to the request of the General Assembly that the Secretary-General report on the status of the civilian rapid deployment roster, including measures to improve its utility, taking into account recent experience with its use (resolution 58/298, para. 9).

This report outlines the status of the pilot civilian rapid deployment roster, analyses its achievements and shortcomings and makes recommendations to improve its utility.

05-29165 (E) 180405

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 58/298 of 18 June 2004, in which the Secretary-General was requested to report to it at its fifty-ninth session on the status of the civilian rapid deployment roster in the context of the support account for peacekeeping operations. The aim of the report is to evaluate the status of the civilian rapid deployment roster and make recommendations to improve its utility.

2. For the purposes of the report, the term "rapid deployment roster" is used to denote the mechanism whereby United Nations staff members are selected and included in a roster. They may then be deployed at short notice and for a limited period of time to perform critical functions during the start-up, surge or liquidation phases of peacekeeping missions.

II. Background

3. In response to one of the key recommendations of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations on the enhancement of the capacity of the United Nations to rapidly mount or expand field operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 91), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations initiated the establishment of a rapid deployment roster of civilian personnel in 2003. This initiative was an integral part of a revised staffing and recruitment strategy for field missions put in place in early 2002 whereby, to the extent possible, all vacant mission posts were to be advertised (see A/58/764).

4. The availability of a rapid deployment mechanism became critical, in particular to meet the immediate requirements of new or expanding missions, given the time needed to process vacancy announcements and select candidates. Furthermore, the existing arrangements of sending required personnel on temporary duty from other missions or from Headquarters were found to be ad hoc in nature and inefficient for both the releasing and the receiving missions.

5. The decision was thus taken to establish, on a pilot basis, for a period of one year a dedicated rapid deployment roster of United Nations staff members. All existing field operations were informed of this initiative on 14 February 2003 by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

6. The pilot rapid deployment roster was to be composed of experienced staff members in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations who were to be deployed for a maximum period of three months to undertake critical tasks in the start-up of a mission, mission enhancement or mission liquidation. The establishment of such a roster would allow a reasonable amount of time to initiate the regular recruitment process, pending the approval of posts and funding. The pilot rapid deployment roster was to function in a staggered manner with three integrated teams. Each team would be prepared to deploy on 14 days' notice for a period of four months and on 60 days' notice for the remaining eight months of the year.

III. Implementation mechanisms of the civilian rapid deployment roster

7. The preparations for the establishment of the pilot rapid deployment roster comprised three phases: (a) initial clearance of candidates (7 March-14 April 2003); (b) technical and medical clearance (14 April-22 May 2003); and (c) establishment of three rapid deployment teams (22 May-4 June 2003). The official launch of the rapid deployment roster was announced on 4 June 2003.

8. Out of approximately 6,500 staff members contacted in the field and at Headquarters, 637 applications were returned by staff members and approved by their immediate supervisors. During the second phase, the rapid deployment roster management team of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations worked in collaboration with several other departments and offices to obtain the technical and medical clearance of those applicants. The selection criteria included previous peacekeeping experience and language skills. Gender balance and geographical distribution were also taken into account. During the third phase, the rapid deployment teams were established and the selected staff members were informed. The composition of the rapid deployment roster by releasing mission and functions performed are reflected in annexes I and II respectively.

9. In July 2003, a rapid deployment roster training programme was conducted at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. Twenty-seven rostered staff members attended. The training covered such issues as leadership and management, planning, team-building, working with operational partners and field skills. Another training session, designed specifically for public information experts, was held in Brindisi in May 2004.

IV. Achievements

10. The rapid deployment roster was put to immediate use, with staff being deployed to the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (5 staff) and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq (5 staff) in June and early July of 2003. Since then, the rapid deployment roster has been utilized most intensively in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (32 staff). In 2004, staff members were deployed to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (6 staff) and to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (6 staff). One staff member was deployed to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission for the liquidation of the mission. As at July 2004, 57 staff members had been deployed from the rapid deployment roster to six missions.

11. One of the key achievements with respect to the roster, its widespread use in UNMIL, is due to a large extent to the fact that the senior management of the Mission was extensively briefed on the rapid deployment roster concept. As a result, the Mission drew heavily on the roster, leading to its first large-scale test.

12. The responses received from the field as well as from Headquarters staff are worth noting. Of all the staff members who responded positively to the request by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, more than 600 were approved by their immediate supervisors. The use of electronic tools greatly contributed to the wide dissemination of roster applications to staff in the field and to the subsequent

management of the roster by linking the system to the Personnel Management and Support Service databases.

13. The 2003 rapid deployment roster exercise was managed through the short-term recruitment against temporarily vacant posts for a limited period of time of two junior Professional staff members and one administrative assistant to process the screening and clearance of applications as well as to inform the candidates selected. For the rapid deployment roster to be effectively maintained and utilized, additional resources should be dedicated to that function.

V. Evaluation of the pilot rapid deployment roster

14. It had been agreed that the pilot 2003 rapid deployment roster would be the subject of an internal evaluation of, among other things, the resource implications and the use of the roster. The Personnel Management and Support Service conducted the evaluation in late 2003. This evaluation was supplemented by a thorough review of the mechanism in the context of the lessons learned study on the start-up phase of UNMIL conducted by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit during the first quarter of 2004. The main observations and recommendations on the present procedures of the rapid deployment roster mechanism are summarized below.

Communications, process and commitment

15. Interactions with the various field missions revealed that a number of issues remained unclear. Those issues relate to the actual purpose and implementation of the rapid deployment roster, its administration and funding or the permissible length of deployment. As a consequence, a number of releasing missions had been reluctant to release staff members who had been cleared and selected, while some receiving missions had questioned the qualifications of the staff member selected by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the roster. It was recommended that greater emphasis be placed on ensuring that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including the field missions, buy in to the rapid deployment roster mechanism. In this view, a comprehensive administrative policy should be developed and communicated to all missions clarifying and explaining all administrative arrangements pertaining to the rapid deployment roster mechanism. It was also recommended that all significant communication between the parties involved (the releasing mission, the receiving mission and the staff member) regarding the roster process be done utilizing the rapid deployment roster management capacity to be established (see para. 23 below).

Composition of the roster

16. A substantial number of critical posts were left either vacant or without a sufficient number of candidates to fully staff the three teams. Some functions were more in demand than others, indicating the need for a review of the critical functions identified. It was recommended that, for positions that are difficult to fill, consideration be given to allowing staff outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including staff of the Department of Management, to apply for the rapid deployment roster. Moreover, consideration within clearly established guidelines could be given to evaluating, in coordination with the United Nations Volunteers

office in Bonn, Germany, the possibility of opening up the roster to United Nations Volunteers currently working with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Finally, the Department would need to review the list of functions and match the applications to the service requirements.

Applications

17. The first exercise was voluntary and the initiative rested with the staff member. While the response has been positive, that approach had a number of shortcomings; namely, some functions did not attract the interest of staff members or supervisors were not willing to release their best staff members for even a limited period of time. It was recommended that a nomination system be introduced, with nominations originating either at Headquarters or in the field missions based on the requests of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. This would ensure improved commitment and involvement of the releasing missions as well as introduce a vetting procedure at both ends of the process.

Selection and clearance process

18. Some dichotomies were observed between the qualifications of applicants who were technically cleared and accepted as part of the rapid deployment roster and the technical skills required to start up a mission. As indicated above, some missions questioned the relevance of the qualifications of some candidates. It was recommended that for each position, terms of reference (job description or generic job profile) be made available at the time of nomination or application. The selection process at Headquarters should also be streamlined through the establishment of a standing selection committee and a network of focal points within the various entities involved in the technical clearance process.

Deployment

19. Some rostered staff members were not released by their parent mission, even though the mission had approved their application. Thus, critical posts were left vacant or had an insufficient number of candidates (see annex III). It was recommended that greater emphasis be placed on securing in advance the release of rostered staff members. The various parties involved (roster candidate, releasing mission, technical unit and receiving mission) should be informed of the implications of their decisions regarding the application process. Rostered staff members should be released when requested, be accepted by the receiving mission and accept the rapid deployment assignment. The application process should be supported by an undertaking signed by both the staff member and the releasing mission.

Medical clearance

20. The medical clearance process took longer than anticipated and in some cases delayed the final composition of the rapid deployment roster teams. This highlights the fact that there is no mechanism to monitor whether or not medical clearances of field staff are up to date. It was recommended that the medical clearance process begin as soon as the first roster candidates are technically cleared. A mechanism is being established within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that medical examinations are up to date for field staff.

Length of deployment

21. The deployment period for rostered staff was set at a maximum of 90 days on the assumption that this would allow sufficient time to recruit longer-term replacement staff. UNMIL submitted nine requests for extension of staff deployed from the roster (out of a total of 32 staff) for periods ranging from two weeks to two months. In other cases the receiving mission and the staff member concerned expressed an interest in remaining in the receiving mission. This development hampered the smooth functioning of the roster process, as it had not been foreseen that the staff member would not return to his or her parent mission. Releasing missions became reluctant to release their staff under those circumstances. It was recommended that the maximum length of the deployment period be extended to 120 days. As the rapid deployment roster is not intended as a transfer mechanism, if a rostered staff member wished to apply for a position in the receiving mission, he or she would first have to return to the releasing mission for a minimum period of three months to enable the latter to identify and select a replacement.

Training programme

22. In 2003 and 2004, as indicated in paragraph 9, two training programmes were organized. This fell short of the initial goal of training all three teams. It was recommended that the training programme be reviewed in terms of content and that it be offered at regular intervals throughout the year so that it would be provided to most individuals included on the roster.

Management and resources

23. In terms of management and resources, both evaluations pointed to the need to allocate dedicated resources to the rapid deployment roster project. It was recommended that the Personnel Management and Support Service be given full responsibility for the management and maintenance of the roster and develop a rapid deployment roster management capacity. Additional staff are required to effectively manage the roster. In addition, financial resources need to be identified to cover the costs associated with the training of rostered staff members.

VI. The way forward

24. The value of a civilian rapid deployment roster mechanism was clearly demonstrated during the 2003 pilot exercise, despite the constraints identified, in that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was able to employ this facility to initially staff new and expanding missions during the surge period.

25. The purpose of the rapid deployment roster will be extended to fully encompass the needs of missions during the start-up, surge and liquidation phases. The team structure will be replaced by a single integrated roster whose members will be individually deployed as and when needed. As such, a revised list of critical functions has been drawn up. A specific number of staff will be selected for each of those functions, thus ensuring that a sufficient number of staff are selected for the roster in case of simultaneous and competing requirements. It is anticipated that the new rapid deployment roster will comprise approximately 365 civilian staff members performing critical functions (see annex IV).

26. Comprehensive revised procedures will be communicated to all field missions and conscientious efforts will be made by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to fully explain the mechanism and its implementation modalities. In particular, it will be clearly stated that the rapid deployment roster facility is not a transfer or promotion mechanism, nor will it substitute for the regular recruitment process. For staff members, placement on the roster may lead to a challenging and rewarding assignment, which should be appropriately recognized through the performance system.

27. In order to ensure a larger pool of candidates, in particular for senior positions and functions that have been difficult to fill, the application process will be extended beyond the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to include the other areas of the Secretariat and, under conditions to be negotiated, United Nations Volunteers serving in peacekeeping operations. It is recommended that the civilian rapid deployment facility be closely linked to other rapid deployment initiatives developed by the Department, such as the memorandum of understanding to set up civilian standby capacities, which was circulated to all Member States.

28. Other major changes will be introduced in the selection and clearance process. The revised process will allow the Department or the missions to nominate staff members for inclusion on the roster. Individual staff members may also continue to nominate themselves, but their release will have to be cleared by their supervisor and the mission. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the overall needs of field missions are met, the final decision on which member of the roster will be sent to a specific mission will be taken by the Department at Headquarters. Due consultations with the releasing and receiving missions will take place, as appropriate and feasible at the time of deployment.

29. Staff selected and placed on the rapid deployment roster will remain on the roster for a period of one year. However, the application process will be open throughout the year to ensure that the roster remains populated and up to date.

30. The electronic application system will be upgraded to meet the new requirements and interface with the databases used by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (including Galaxy). Generic job profiles for each critical position will be made available and each applicant will be requested to submit a personal history profile. Each application will be certified by the immediate supervisor of the applicant. Nominations of candidates by managers will be made in consultation with staff members and their direct supervisors.

31. The maximum deployment period will be extended to 120 days. With the concurrence of both the receiving and releasing missions, roster staff may apply for a position in the receiving mission but will have to return to his or her parent mission for a minimum period of three months.

32. A critical element of the new rapid deployment roster mechanism will be a strengthened and improved training programme. Selected members of the roster will be required to participate in a training programme that will take place over a period of seven to nine days. This training will be offered at regular intervals throughout the year. It will be designed to train integrative skills and be aimed at enhancing ability to function in a team environment under challenging conditions and often without direct supervision.

33. An evaluation mechanism will be built into the new procedures. The management of receiving missions will ensure that exit questionnaires are completed by each staff member deployed through the roster and his or her supervisor upon completion of the assignment. Supervisors' responses will determine the future participation of the staff member in the rapid deployment roster programme. Both the supervisor's and staff member's evaluations will be used to evaluate the rapid deployment roster mechanism on an ongoing basis.

34. As indicated in paragraph 23 above, a rapid deployment roster management capacity will be established within the Personnel Management and Support Service. Management functions will include coordinating the rapid deployment roster selection and clearance process; continuously monitoring the roster; identifying gaps and issuing general and specific application request announcements as necessary to ensure that the roster remains populated and up to date; and identifying opportunities, such as visits to missions, to meet with staff and supervisors to promote and discuss the programme. Focal points will be appointed in each technical entity in the Secretariat to provide technical advice and help to locate candidates. The rapid deployment roster will be renewed annually. One additional General Service post to support rapid deployment roster management is being requested in the 2005/06 support account budget.

VII. Conclusion

35. The rapid deployment roster mechanism represents an important initiative to strengthen the ability of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to rapidly mount field operations and provide temporary additional support to a field mission undergoing expansion or other changes in the concept of operations, including downsizing. Missions and participating staff members both gain from participation in the rapid deployment roster programme. The benefit to the receiving mission is the ready availability of experienced, qualified, field-tested peacekeepers who can hit the ground running. The benefit to the releasing mission includes the re-absorption of staff who return from the experience having gained new and/or stronger skills and richer peacekeeping experience. The benefits to the staff member include exposure to new challenges that have the potential to enhance personal and professional experience, expertise and skills.

36. The rapid deployment roster is but one of the means being examined by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to address its fundamental need to meet urgent operational requirements through the development of a cadre of highly qualified professional peacekeepers who are available to deploy on short notice. The Department will report on efforts to build such a cadre and the conditions of service underpinning the ability to recruit, retain, develop and rapidly deploy these individuals in its comprehensive report on the conditions of field service, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/266 of 23 December 2004.

VIII. Action to be taken by the General Assembly

37. **The General Assembly is requested to take note of the present report.**

Annex I

Composition of the rapid deployment roster by releasing mission and team

Releasing entity	*Team 1*	*Team 2*	*Team 3*	*Total*
Headquarters	19	16	11	46
United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic	1	0	0	1
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	6	4	2	12
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	5	8	5	18
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	8	4	7	19
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	10	9	7	26
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	1	3	0	4
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	0	1	0	1
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	5	10	3	18
United Nations Mission in Angola	1	0	0	1
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	6	2	4	12
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	30	25	23	78
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	12	13	9	34
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	6	0	2	8
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	3	2	0	5
Total	**115**	**97**	**72**	**283**

Annex II

Composition of the rapid deployment roster by function

Function	*Team 1*	*Team 2*	*Team 3*	*Total*
Office of Head of Mission	6	5	6	17
Planning team	3	3	3	9
Political affairs	3	3	3	9
Public information	4	4	3	11
Civil affairs	3	3	3	9
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	0	0	0	0
Development and rehabilitation	4	4	3	11
Human rights	1	0	0	1
Rule of law	1	0	0	1
Office of the Director of Administration	11	10	8	29
Office of the Chief, Integrated Support Services/Communication and Information Technology Service	4	4	3	11
Joint Logistics Operation Centre	4	1	1	6
Movement Control Section	2	3	1	6
Commodity units	2	2	1	5
Contingent-owned equipment	2	2	0	4
Air operations	2	1	0	3
Engineering	9	6	2	17
Communication and Information Technology Service	15	11	10	36
Supply and warehouse	6	4	0	10
Transport	10	9	7	26
Medical	1	1	1	3
Office of the Chief, Administrative Services	2	2	1	5
General services	6	7	4	17
Personnel	6	5	6	17
Procurement	2	2	2	6
Finance	4	5	5	14
Total	**113**	**97**	**73**	**283**

Annex III

Critical posts vacant or without sufficient candidates

Senior-level posts

Chief of Staff

Senior DDR Officer

Director of Administration/Chief Administrative Officer

Chief Security Officer

Chief of Integrated Support Services/Technical Services

Chief Joint Logistics Operation Centre

Chief, Movement Control Section

Chief, Communication and Information Technology Service

Chief Supply

Civilian Personnel Officer

Senior Human Rights

Chief of Administrative Services

Chief of General Services

Chief Procurement Officer

Mid-level and support posts

Legal Officer

DDR Officer

Spokesperson

Human Rights Officer

Air Safety Officer

Logistics Officer/Contract Management

Communications Officer

Information Technology Officer

Broadcast Technician

Medical Officer

Nurse

Personnel Officer

Finance/Budget Officer

Annex IV

List of critical positions (civilian staff)

Critical positions	*Small mission*		*Medium-sized mission*		*Large mission*	
	Grade	*Number*	*Grade*	*Number*	*Grade*	*Number*
Office of the Head of Mission						
Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Assistant Secretary-General	1	Under-Secretary-General	1	Under-Secretary-General	1
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General	D-2	1	Assistant Secretary-General	1	Assistant Secretary-General	1
Special Assistant	P-4	1	P-5, P-4	1, 1	P-5, P-4	1, 1
Senior Secretary	General Service	2	General Service	2	General Service	2
Chief of Staff	—	—	D-1	1	D-2	1
Legal Adviser/Officer	P-4	1	P-5	1	P-5-D-1	1
Administrative Assistant	General Service	1	General Service	2	General Service	2

Critical positions	*Grade*	*Number*
Political affairs		
Senior Political Affairs Officer	P-5 to D-2	5
Political Affairs Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Public information		
Chief Information Officer/Spokesperson	P-4 to D-1	5
Public Information Officer	P-3	5
Radio/Video Producer	P-3	5
Broadcast Technician Officer (if applicable)	P-3	5
Civil affairs		
Senior Civil Affairs Officer	P-5 to D-1	5
Civil Affairs Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration		
Senior Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	P-5 to D-1	5
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Development and rehabilitation		
Senior Development and Rehabilitation Officer	P-5 to D-1	5
Quick Impact Project Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Gender affairs		
Gender Adviser/Affairs Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
HIV/AIDS		
HIV/AIDS Adviser/Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Human rights		
Senior Human Rights Officer	P-5 to D-1	5
Human Rights Officer	P-3 to P-4	5

Critical positions	*Grade*	*Number*
Rule of law and corrections		
Senior Judicial Affairs Officer	P-5 to D-1	5
Judicial Affairs Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Corrections Adviser	P-3 to P-4	5
Security		
Chief Security Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Security Officer	P-2 to P-3	5
	Field Service	5
Close Protection Officer	Field Service	5
Subtotal, substantive		**115**
Administration		
Chief Administrative Officer	P-5 to D-2	5
Legal Officer	P-4	5
Administrative Officer	P-3 to P-5	5
Administrative Assistant	General Service	5
Aviation Safety Unit		
Aviation Safety Officer	P-2 to P-4	5
Budget Unit		
Chief of Budget/Budget Officer	P-3 to P-5	5
Budget Assistant	General Service	5
Finance Section		
Chief Finance Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Finance Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Finance Assistant/Cashier	General Service	5
Civilian Personnel Section		
Chief Civilian Personnel Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Human Resources Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Human Resources Assistant	General Service	5
Procurement Section		
Chief Procurement Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Procurement Officer	P-2 to P-3	5
General Services Section		
Chief General Services Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
General Services Assistant	Field Service	5
Property Control and Inventory Officer	P-3	5
Property Control and Inventory Assistant	Field Service	5
Receiving and Inspection Officer	P-2	5
Receiving and Inspection Assistant	Field Service	5
Medical Unit		
Medical Officer	P-4 to P-5	5

Critical positions	*Grade*	*Number*
Training Unit		
Training Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Surface Transport Section		
Chief Transport Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Transport Assistant (workshop)	Field Service	5
Transport Assistant (warehouse)	Field Service	5
Transport Assistant (dispatch)	Field Service	5
Air operations		
Chief Aviation Officer	P-4	5
Aviation Officer	P-3	5
Movement control		
Chief Movement Control	P-4	5
Movement Control Assistant	P-3	5
Supply		
Chief Supply Officer	P-4 to P-5	5
Supply Officer (warehouse)	P-3	5
Supply Officer (rations)	P-3	5
Supply Officer (fuel contracts)	P-3	5
Supply Officer (contingent-owned equipment)	P-3	5
Engineering		
Chief Engineer	P-4 to P-5	5
Stores Assistant	Field Service	5
Facilities Management Assistant	Field Service	5
Electrician	Field Service	5
Generator Technician	Field Service	5
Logistics		
Chief, Integrated Support Services	P-5 to D-1	5
Logistics Officer	P-3 to P-4	5
Communication and Information Technology Service		
Chief, Communication and Information Technology Service	P-4 to P-5	5
Chief, Information Technology	P-3 to P-4	5
Satellite Technician	Field Service	5
Telephone Technician	Field Service	5
Radio/Microwave Technician	Field Service	5
Information Technology Technician/Systems Support	Field Service	5
Wide-Area Network Technician	Field Service	5
Subtotal, administrative support		**250**
Total civilians		**365**

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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the operational capacity of the United Nations Military Observers*

Summary

United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) play a crucial role in peacekeeping operations that has evolved from monitoring compliance with ceasefire agreements to more complex tasks including governance, humanitarian and human rights issues.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services noted that, although several models of UNMO command and control are currently employed in missions, the requirement is for a more generic, and streamlined structure that allows greater integration of the staffs at higher level while maintaining operational independence at lower levels.

To enhance the mission preparedness of UNMOs it is necessary to ensure adherence to common standards in national training and to strengthen mission-specific training. Deployments and repatriations of UNMOs should be staggered to ensure continuity. Excessive delays in the initial deployment of UNMOs could be reduced by introducing a standby roster of qualified national candidates.

* The present report could not be submitted prior to the deadline due to the need to obtain comments of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the draft report.

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To enhance their security and safety, UNMOs should always operate within the range of reliable communications of armed contingents and should be provided with an armed escort, where necessary. However, UNMOs should remain unarmed, as being armed might compromise them operationally while not providing any meaningful protection. UNMOs should have an identity distinct from the armed contingents in order to emphasize their unarmed status.

The Office observed that the armed contingents and UNMOs both acknowledged their respective responsibilities towards each other. However, that relationship should be formalized with sufficient clarity in the force directives, clearly assigning the responsibility for the security of UNMOs to contingent forces, while making UNMOs accountable for gathering information. Logistical support to UNMOs needs improvement, including the provision of advanced technology.

Since UNMOs play a significant role in the end phases of a mission, there should be an effective exit strategy allowing them to continue to monitor and observe in order to ensure the sustainability of the peace process. The UNMO experiences should be summarized in a compendium of best practices and a focal point dealing with UNMO issues should be established in the Military Division.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations welcomed the review, saying it came at an appropriate time, and also acknowledged that it provided useful and relevant information and analysis that should give a new dimension to the ongoing review of UNMO policy.

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Abbreviations

CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMO	Chief Military Observer
COS	Chief of Staff
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFC	Deputy Force Commander
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FC	Force Commander
HF	high frequency
HQ	Headquarters
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
Lt. Col.	Lieutenant Colonel
MINURSO	United Nations Mission in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MSA	Mission subsistence allowance
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop contributing country
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Monitoring Group in India and Pakistan
UNOMIG	United Nations Mission in Georgia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce and Supervisory Organization
VHF	Very high frequency

I. Introduction

1. Initially, United Nations peacekeeping operations were military observer missions assigned to monitor ceasefires, truces or armistice agreements. The task of the United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) was limited to supervising, verifying and reporting compliance with ceasefire agreements, separation and withdrawal of forces, as well as monitoring the cessation of foreign assistance to former belligerents. More recently, the context and scope of peacekeeping has broadened, bringing about new challenges and making UNMO's role more complex. Threats to UNMO security have become more serious. However, the complexity of the environment and the new tasks did not appear to result in a commensurate revision of UNMO's role and operational modalities. The conceptualization of the verification and monitoring of peace agreements continues to be based more on traditional arms control theories than on the dynamics of conflict resolution, and is often guided by standard military concepts of operations rather than innovations designed specifically for the new responsibility of UNMOs for observation, monitoring and verification.

2. The Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reviewed the operational capacity of UNMOs with a view to fostering action by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency in the context of multi-dimensional peacekeeping. The review focused on issues crucial to UNMO operations, such as command and control, selection and training, deployment, rotation and repatriation, use of advanced technology and administrative and logistics support. It looked into the UNMO role in the mission vis-à-vis the armed contingents and how this affects their security and safety, as well as their cooperation and coordination with other components of the mission.

3. The Office collected information about UNMOs through questionnaires and interviews with key actors involved in the UNMO operations and national peacekeeping training centres. The terms of reference, questionnaires and response statistics are available in the Annex to the electronic version of this report available through the following web address: (www.un.org/depts/oios/mecd_report/2005_unmoreview.pdf). OIOS field visits to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) allowed for a closer look at UNMO operational issues and for a validation of the Office's findings and recommendations. OIOS greatly appreciates the cooperation extended to it by DPKO, field commanders and UNMOs in the course of this exercise, and this report incorporates the Department's comments of 18 March 2005 to a draft version of the report.

II. Evolution of peacekeeping and the role of United Nations Military Observers

4. Most post-cold war conflicts are civil wars in which front-lines are not always clear and warring parties not easily identified. Instead of armies, peacekeepers often have to deal with militia groups and private security forces in which the chains of command are harder to track. Rules of combat are often abandoned, and more

crucially, the casualties of war are now predominantly civilians, who are not only the victims, but also perpetrators. The collapse of state institutions exacerbates the conflict's impact.

5. For United Nations peacekeepers, the emphasis has shifted from a monitoring or observation role to active involvement in resolving and settling conflicts and preventing the resumption of hostilities. Contemporary multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping often includes, along with the supervision of ceasefires, the regrouping, disarmament and demobilization of combatants and their reintegration into civilian life and programmes for mine clearance, the return of refugees and displaced persons, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the restoration of law and order, the monitoring of respect for human rights, the observation and supervision of elections, and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. This broadening of peacekeeping activities has had a direct impact on the role of UNMOs, whose duties have also expanded beyond merely the monitoring of ceasefires and separation of forces.

6. Currently, 13 of the 17 United Nations peacekeeping missions worldwide have UNMOs. They are unarmed, wear national military uniforms and are often deployed and organized separately from the regular armed contingents. The diversity and complexity of the tasks of the military observer depend on the mandate of the particular mission and the prevailing political and military situation.

7. The comparative advantage of UNMOs is that they have wider and more flexible outreach into the ranks of belligerents and the civilian population than the armed contingents. They can rapidly and effectively obtain and report the most current information on controversial incidents and contentious developments that are of vital importance to the mission. They also monitor and assess evolving situations in areas of concern and provide their findings to a multidisciplinary Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) that provides timely and comprehensive analyses to the leadership of the mission. Peacekeeping missions thus benefit from the more in-depth and wider ground coverage by UNMOs, which enhances their capacity to deal with complex situations.

8. OIOS noted the deep understanding by UNMOs of their role, tasks, challenges and operational requirements. Out of a total of 352 UNMO responses received to the OIOS questionnaire, 95 per cent viewed the challenges faced by UNMOs in contemporary peacekeeping operations as more complex than in traditional missions. They mostly attributed this to an increased involvement of the civilian population in conflicts and to the fact that belligerent forces were less willing to negotiate and compromise. All respondents believed that, based on their experiences, the challenges to individual UNMOs were becoming more demanding and the threats to their security and personal safety were increasing.

9. An area of concern reflected by three quarters of the respondents concerned administrative and logistics support from the mission headquarters. They were of the view that, in spite of the prevalent practice of an integrated support service concept in missions, the administration and logistics did not distinguish sufficiently between armed contingents and UNMOs, and treated the latter as if they were part of the self-sustaining contingent force. OIOS observed instances where, even when radio and observation equipment was available in mission, it was not issued to the UNMOs ostensibly on grounds that they are military, without consideration to their unarmed status.

III. Command and control

10. National armies have different concepts of command and control. OIOS is guided in this regard by the term "operational authority" as described in the United Nations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations. According to the Guidelines, the head of the military component of a peacekeeping operation, who may not be the chief of mission, is given appropriate authority over all military units and personnel in the mission in the light of operational requirements. The command and control structure in peacekeeping operations is mission specific and varies widely, depending on the political and military situation and on the mission's operational requirements.

11. Typically, a peacekeeping mission comprises three components — civilian, military and civilian police. The military component may consist of armed contingents headed by a Force Commander (FC) and/or unarmed military observers. Among the 13 missions with UNMOs, four different organizational structures are currently used. Four of these missions use a model that is basically for observer missions (UNMOGIP, UNOMIG, UNTSO, MINURSO), where the Chief Military Observer (CMO) exercises full operational authority down to the UNMO teams. Three missions (UNMISET, UNMIK, UNAMA) use variations of a second model, which has a separate chain of command for UNMOs, who report directly to the Head of Mission. An example of this model is given below for UNMISET.

Figure 1: Command and Control Structure for UNMISET



12. In the second model, the underlying assumption is that UNMOs are a strategic-level asset that must be controlled at the highest level, i.e. the Head of Mission. Consequently, there must be two sets of "Concepts of Operations": one for UNMOs and one for armed contingents. Under this model, the information gathering by UNMOs tends to be dictated primarily by the political requirements of the mission, whereas the purely military concerns of the peacekeeping force are often given a secondary priority in the tasking of the UNMOs. This arrangement also complicates coordination at lower levels and lengthens the information transmission and reaction time, because reports must necessarily go up and down the two separate reporting lines.

13. The third model follows the principle of "unity of command", wherein all military units are under the operational authority of the FC. An example of this model is shown below for UNMIL.

Figure 2: Command and Control Structure for UNMIL



Under this model (as applied in UNMIL and with slight variations in MONUC, UNAMSIL and UNMEE), the CMO is also the Deputy Force Commander (DFC), although below that level there are two distinct chains of command. OIOS observed that in reality, this model is the same as the second because the CMO does not function as a full-fledged DFC. Indeed, the usual function of a deputy, besides standing in for the commander in his/her absence, is to oversee administration and logistics, thereby allowing the commander to concentrate on other operational matters. However, in the peacekeeping context, where administration and logistics are mainly civilian functions, these responsibilities are minimal and the DFC reverts to his principal role as CMO. This model often hampers an effective flow of information, as in the case of UNAMSIL. During the period of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), while information was relayed regularly up the chain of UNMO command, the flow of information down to the team sites appeared inadequate, and few guidelines were provided as to the manner, speed and direction the DDR should take, leading to confusion and impeding the operational effectiveness of the UNMOs.

14. The main weakness of the second and third models lies in the physical separation of the UNMO chain of command from that of the armed contingents, resulting in structural restrictions for coordination at lower tactical levels. The fourth model as shown below reflects a greater integration of UNMOs into the command and control chain of the contingent force. This model, currently in use in ONUB and UNOCI, has UNMOs operating under the control of the Operations Branch at Force Headquarters.

Figure 3: UNMO Command and Control Structure in ONUB



This model does not appear to optimize the operational effectiveness of the UNMOs for several reasons. First, the Operations Branch does not necessarily provide expert supervision because the national contingent staff in the Branch may not have UNMO experience, or sufficient time for UNMO activities owing to their full-time involvement with the operations of the armed contingents. Secondly, UNMO reports tend to pass through many layers in the chain of command, and consequently, the information that reaches the FC may have been filtered several times. In addition, UNMOs do not have a strong representation at the top level, which negatively affects their credibility among other mission components. The UNMOs are viewed as "just another card in the pack" and not as an important source for crucial information.

15 From the questionnaire responses, OIOS noted that 81 per cent of the respondents saw a need to keep the command structure for UNMOs separate from that of the armed contingents and headed by a CMO. This correlated with the responses from sector and battalion commanders, a majority of whom felt that UNMOs should not be subordinated to tactical-level commanders. More than 90 per cent of UNMOs felt that the post of CMO should not be abolished, as it provided them a direct link to the senior echelons of command. In missions where there is no designated CMO, UNMOs feel that their credibility is compromised, a view that was shared by many armed contingent commanders. The commanders at the sector level were of the view that UNMOs need not be placed under their operational command, but that mission orders and standard operating procedures (SOP) should be precise as to the nature of the relationship between the two elements. This would enable the armed contingents to provide essential security and administrative support to UNMOs when the need arose, while at the same time facilitating better coordination of operational activities.

16. To ensure effective integration, there must be a system that uses a common communications plan, SOPs and reporting procedures. The priority consideration should be to have a single and unified chain of command such that the operational needs of UNMOs receive attention at a high level in the mission hierarchy, at the

same time enabling unhindered upward flow of information gathered by UNMOs in the field. In this regard, OIOS believes that the ONUB model is too highly integrated. In order to incorporate the positive aspects of all the models, OIOS suggests the model shown below.

Figure 4: Suggested command and control structure



17. Under this model, both UNMOs and the armed contingents fall under the operational authority of the FC and their operational planning and control is exercised through a single headquarters headed by a Chief of Staff. This structure provides for effective integration of UNMOs through a single and unified chain of command at the Force Headquarters level while maintaining their operational identity and independence at the sector and lower levels. It also eliminates the need for separate operations room and duty officers substantially reducing the size of the headquarters staff. DPKO, too, has supported the Office's views that close cooperation between UNMOs and any peacekeeping force should be emphasized. The Department does not favour separate command and control arrangements between these two components. DPKO concurs with OIOS that both components should always be under the operational command of the FC and their operational planning and control should be exercised through a single headquarters. DPKO however, considers that, when appropriate, a small UNMO cell located in the G1 (personnel), G3 (operations) and/or G4 (logistics) groups at Force Headquarters should deal with UNMO-related matters, such as operational employment and administration including logistics. DPKO further informed OIOS that an observer cell had been established in MONUC Force Headquarters that reports to the FC through the Force Chief of Staff. The cell is manned by staff officers who do not have UNMO status.

18. Another advantage of this suggested structure is that the JMAC would be able to obtain unfiltered information and raw data from the sectors and UNMO teams, enabling it to make more accurate assessments. This improvement notwithstanding, it should be noted that currently the JMAC remains a purely military entity under the FC. As explained to the OIOS team, ideally, the JMAC should be operating at a level above the FC as a joint civil-military information analysis centre and reporting

directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Then, the information flow would be as shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Information flow chart for the suggested command and control



19. While highlighting the advantages of the suggested command and control structure, OIOS recognizes that flexibility is important and that it should not be a "one-size-fits-all" model. The political and military situation and overall complexity of the peacekeeping mission have to be taken into consideration when deciding on a particular structure. OIOS sees merit in the views of DPKO in this regard, and encourages it to review the mission command and control structures of the newer missions for a comparative analysis in the future.

IV. The selection and training of United Nations Military Observers

20. In order to be able to cope with the challenges of living in difficult conditions and accomplishing diverse and complex tasks in high stress situations, often with no immediate support, officers selected as UNMOs need to be physically fit and psychologically sound. They should have a mature attitude and outlook as well as appropriate qualifications and mission experience. Three quarters of all respondents to the OIOS questionnaires stressed that the most pressing challenge faced by UNMOs was caused by team members having different levels of military skills, training and experience. In the order of importance, the next challenges identified by respondents were differing levels of language proficiency, driving skills, radio communications and map-reading skills (including use of global positioning system technology). DPKO has stated that, based on experience from past years, key issues of concern related to language proficiency and driving skills.

21. The divergent proficiency profiles of officers from different nations is not surprising, given the different mother tongues, military cultures, training standards, technology and even terminology used. Some nations select officers from their reserve components, while others select them from their active regular forces. While officers from either source may be equally qualified, they require different training strategies. Occasionally, officers are seconded as UNMOs not for their military skills and experience, but because of language and other proficiencies.

22. OIOS is cognizant that peacekeeping duties require personal attributes such as courage and commitment, interpersonal skills, patience, and the ability to assess and report, all of which are not easy to appraise. DPKO concurs with the Office's view that it would be very useful if all contributing nations followed the same selection criteria, including the required skills and standards of proficiency outlined in the Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for United Nations Military Observers (2002). National selection and training syllabi and modalities should be based on a clear understanding of the attributes required for UNMO duty, with emphasis on analytical skills, which are viewed as crucial, as OIOS gathered examples of UNMO patrol reports, which took the form of travel diaries owing to their inability to structure the content and come up with meaningful analyses.

23. OIOS acknowledges the various initiatives by DPKO to ensure that UNMOs deployed in the field have adequate training. In particular, the establishment of mission training cells by the Training and Evaluation Service, the pre-deployment training of UNMO team leaders, and the introduction of course curricula based on standardized training modules are commended. Based on the analysis of the requirement profile and inputs from respondents, OIOS believes that, to the extent possible, pre-deployment training should cover:

- the United Nations system, peacekeeping mission organization, and general administration, reports and procedures;
- the United Nations code of conduct and applicable international and local laws and customs;
- required military skills and their application in peacekeeping;
- communication skills (written and oral), relevant protocols and equipment;
- driving proficiency in the types of vehicles and terrain in the operational area;
- negotiation and mediation skills and techniques; and
- specialized training for duties such as election monitoring and humanitarian assistance.

24. OIOS found that some countries were not providing any UNMO training to their officers. For these officers, familiarization training on arrival to the mission served as their first observer training. However, for others who had received national training, the familiarization training was too simple and they suggested more focus on mission-specific aspects, including technology such as the global positioning system (GPS) and Lotus Notes. While DPKO has put in place a mechanism to evaluate and assess armed military contingents prior to their deployment, no such mechanism has yet been developed to assess pre-deployment preparedness of military observers. DPKO should require troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to certify that every proposed UNMO candidate has completed a

United Nations recognized UNMO course at a national peacekeeping training centre. While OIOS acknowledges national sensitivities regarding any form of oversight when it comes to military training, it is of the view that the development of common standards is the only way to enhance excellence in peacekeeping proficiency. In addition, OIOS emphasizes the need to explore the possibility of organizing centralized pre-deployment training for UNMOs in regional peacekeeping training centres as is being done for staff officers and UNMO team leaders.

25. OIOS re-emphasizes the following forceful actions to enhance the performance of UNMOs, most of which are currently being implemented by DPKO:

- prompt repatriation of those UNMOs who do not meet the established standards, with expenses to be paid by their countries;
- recommendation of the necessary remedial measures to countries that provide insufficiently trained UNMOs;
- refusal to accept UNMOs from nations that have not complied with DPKO recommendations; and
- holding the countries sponsoring UNMOs who damage United Nations equipment (such as vehicles) owing to poor training liable for repair/replacement costs, and holding the individual UNMO liable if the damage/loss was due to negligence.

26. OIOS observed that the selection of UNMO team leaders sometimes presents a problem. The current practice is for the longest serving UNMO at any given team site to be selected as team leader. However, questionnaire respondents indicated that the appointment of an UNMO of junior rank as the team leader (even though with longer service) has led to tensions and, in some cases, to a breakdown of military discipline. Taking this into account, a possible solution could be for the selection of team leaders to be based strictly on the rank but for deputy team leaders to be appointed on the basis of in-mission experience and leadership qualities. Of course, the final judgment guiding the decision should always rest with the FC/CMO.

27. OIOS noted that some troop-contributing countries tended to send officers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, even when they were specifically requested to send Majors and Captains, while others would make representations requesting to send more Lieutenant Colonels as team leaders. To ensure a balanced distribution of team leader positions among troop-contributing countries, these positions should be distributed in proportion to the overall number of observers that an individual country fields to that mission. Troop-contributing countries should therefore be requested to adhere strictly to the specified rank requirement in their selection of UNMOs. Furthermore, a common understanding must be worked out concerning promotions while on UNMO duty; promotion should either precipitate a withdrawal, or become effective only upon repatriation.

28. OIOS noted that participation of female UNMOs opens an opportunity for more effective engagement with female combatants, civilians and children. Also for the gender balance of the mission, a larger availability of UNMOs in female ranks should be encouraged.

V. Deployment, rotation and repatriation

29. For the initial deployment of military observers following authorization by the Security Council, the Military Division of DPKO initiates a request to the Permanent Missions of the troop-contributing countries, which normally includes the number of UNMOs, the ranks, proficiency and skill requirements, tour of duty, and tentative date of deployment. OIOS found that the slow response from some Member States was usually a delaying factor in deploying military observers to the field. In some cases, more than three months lapsed before arrival of UNMOs to the mission. OIOS noted that this situation has now improved with the creation of a "rotation cell" in the Force Generation Service and the use of a software program known as PMSTAR (Police and Military Staff Travel and Rotation), which DPKO will soon be making available to the Permanent Missions and at a later stage to the capitals of troop-contributing countries. DPKO further states that this database had indicated no delays during the year 2004 except for UNOMIG, where the troop-contributing countries had difficulty in obtaining visas. OIOS also acknowledges the difficulties faced by DPKO in the on-call system part of its Standby Arrangements System, which did not succeed owing to failure on the part of Member States to review the names of officers required every half year. However, OIOS wishes to point out that the Civilian Police Division had similar difficulties with initial deployments before establishing a standby roster of qualified candidates and believes that DPKO should also explore ways to apply the experiences and lessons learned by the Civilian Police Division to improve its system for deploying UNMOs.

30. Upon arrival in the mission, UNMOs are given induction and pre-deployment training at mission Headquarters, receive essential equipment and are then dispatched to a sector where they are provided with yet another set of briefings on the operational setting, duties and tasks. The UNMOs are then dispatched to the team site that serves as their operational base. In some missions, the whole procedure lasts 2 to 3 weeks before an observer becomes operational. Similarly, a slack period occurs during the check-out phase, when UNMOs return their specialist equipment and undergo final clearance formalities. Protracted check-ins and check-outs reduce the effective stay of UNMOs in the field. DPKO should take measures to reduce this overhead time by streamlining the induction and check-out procedures.

31. Considering rotations, the UNMO Guidelines to troop-contributing countries state that at least three months prior to the completion of a tour of duty of an UNMO, the Military Division will send a fax to the respective country's Permanent Mission asking for a replacement. The procedure is based on the premise that the Permanent Missions need to be reminded to provide replacements. The entire procedure could be expedited if the data sought in the initial request to the Permanent Missions also included the date for providing replacements at the end of their tours of duty.

32. The rotation of UNMOs poses important challenges to the continuity of institutional memory, particularly if all of the UNMOs become due for rotation at the same time, as is being experienced in ONUB currently. This situation usually arises where the UNMOs are deployed and arrive in the mission all at once and when their tours of duty are of the same duration. OIOS is of the view that a system should be designed to stagger their rotation, based either on staggered arrivals to the

mission or different tours of duty, at least for the first group to arrive in the mission. Regarding in-mission rotations, it is of note that some team sites are located in remote areas, making their living conditions very harsh. Prolonged operation in these areas bears heavily on individual performance and morale. Missions should issue strict guidelines to ensure that UNMOs deployed in such difficult conditions are rotated frequently, preferably every three to four months.

33. Although a one-year tour of duty is the most common, OIOS found that some troop-contributing countries provided their personnel for only six months. Clearly, a one-year tour of duty is more beneficial for a mission and is better suited for ensuring the continuity of experience, thereby minimizing disruptive rotations and preserving institutional memory. The arbitrary variation of the tour of duty by individual troop-contributing countries should be discouraged and a one-year tour of duty should be standardized for all UNMOs.

VI. Security and safety

34. UNMOs are normally deployed unarmed in forward locations, and as such, they are vulnerable to attack, hostage-taking and harassment. They represent a vulnerable target, should belligerents wishing to put pressure on a peace operation as a whole, as has happened in a number of missions. A complicating factor is that contemporary intra-state conflicts are characterized by numerous small factions and splinter groups, making it virtually impossible to obtain the consent of all parties to the peace process. This greatly increases the risk to UNMOs because the smaller factions tend to seek visibility, attention and recognition by causing disorder and threatening the success of the mission.

35. In answering the OIOS questionnaire, almost 75 per cent of all respondents said that the challenges placed on individual UNMOs were becoming more demanding and that the threat to personal security and safety increased. In spite of the perception of increased risk, 77 per cent of respondents were convinced that UNMOs should not be armed even when operating in Chapter VII missions. The same share of respondents (77 per cent) believed that UNMOs should be provided with armed escorts for movement if the security situation became precarious. The Military Division also believes that UNMOs should not be armed.

36. The most common concern to UNMOs security was the availability of safe, reliable and efficient communications. It is not unusual for teams to conduct patrols outside the zone of communication and in some instances this has caused a team's failure to signal delays of its return to team sites. Missions should make every effort to ensure that UNMOs have reliable communications, both HF and VHF, including ground-to-air communications, upon deployment to a remote location. The installation of repeater stations and rebroadcast sites should be a matter of priority to help ensure that UNMO team sites are within communication range of the armed contingents in their sector.

37. A major safeguard to UNMOs security is provided in cooperation with the armed contingents. DPKO should ensure that SOPs, guidelines and force directives emphasize that responsibility for the safety of UNMOs rests with the armed contingents. Missions should also ensure that designated contingent units or sector headquarters have on standby a highly mobile quick reaction team, including aviation assets necessary for emergency extraction and evacuation of UNMOs. This

also requires joint training between UNMOs, armed contingents and mission aviation to prepare them for such emergencies.

38. One of the major security risks to UNMOs is their deployment to remote locations in small numbers. Since UNMOs receive mission subsistence allowances, they are not provided with living accommodation by the United Nations. Consequently, they make independent arrangements for individual living accommodation in the local communities in the area of deployment. Invariably, no threat assessment is ever made and each UNMO is left to fend for him/herself. OIOS is of the view that each mission should conduct regular threat assessments at the sector level and efforts should be made to arrange accommodations in close proximity to each other. Missions should also provide administrative support to UNMOs in drafting legal lease documents and, when necessary, provide local guards.

39. Although the use of advanced technology, such as night surveillance devices and satellite systems, could enhance security for UNMOs, OIOS believes that the main focus remains on proper training and selection, which should significantly lower the personal security risk faced by UNMOs. OIOS noted that in some cases, there was a general lack of awareness among UNMOs of any real risk management processes. In one particular case, UNMOs did not carry sufficient equipment to allow for their successful survival in the event of a forced escape and evasion or extraction; and even fewer were trained to undertake critical security assessments of their environment in order to prepare for unplanned occurrences.

40. Since UNMOs do not carry defensive weapons, building relationships with belligerents can also play an important role in assisting UNMOs facing security challenges. OIOS noted examples when prompt and decisive intervention by senior UNMOs with commanders of belligerent detachments allowed the extraction of UNMOs under fire and in hostage situations. These examples underscore the importance and emphasize the need for proper selection criteria to identify the critical attributes for UNMOs, and also the benefits of training in negotiation and mediation, as well as communication and language skills.

41. All questionnaire respondents felt that UNMOs needed to have a separate identity from the armed contingents to clearly distinguish their unarmed status. Many of them suggested using distinctive arm bands or different head dress and different markings on UNMO vehicles as effective ways for identifying and distinguishing UNMOs from armed contingents. The generally accepted view is that belligerents do not consider UNMOs to be a threat because of their unarmed status. For that reason, it is imperative that they are clearly distinguishable from the armed contingents in order to enhance their personal security and safety. It could be done by distinctive markings on uniform and vehicles, special ID cards, clearly marked UNMO flag, and through public information messages. In addition, UNMOs could also have a distinguishing flag to be flown alongside the United Nations flag so that their premises are easily identified and accessible to both belligerent forces and the civilian population.

VII. Cooperation and coordination with other peacekeeping elements

42. Peacekeeping is a joint and closely coordinated effort of all mission components. Peacekeeping operations are manned by military personnel from many different nations and also by civilians from many United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Governments and United Nations civilian police. Complex peacekeeping missions comprise the full scope of such personnel. The first mission to be described as complex was the successful UNTAC mission in Cambodia, while current examples include UNTAET/UNMISET in East Timor, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An example of the organizational structure of a complex mission is given below for MONUC.

Figure 6: Example of a complex peacekeeping mission (MONUC)



43. Cooperation and coordination is the keystone for efficiency and effectiveness in complex peacekeeping operations, particularly for UNMOs who operate in small groups in remote locations. There are two main aspects: first, the cooperation and coordination between the military components in the mission; and second, the cooperation and coordination with civilian counterparts.

44. The disruptions in cooperation and coordination between military units in general, and between UNMOs and armed contingents in particular, often result from the lack of a common understanding of their respective roles in the mission. The dire consequences of such failure could include:

- action that should be taken is not taken, because orders are not understood or are simply ignored;
- directives are misunderstood or interpreted as contrary to the mission mandate; and

- the personal security of UNMOs is threatened because of the potential misinterpretation of "use of force guidance" found in the rules of engagement.

45. A key aspect in addressing these potential failures in cooperation and coordination is effective communication. Effective communication requires that everyone be kept informed and briefed at all times and that there is a continuous sharing of information, especially between armed contingents and UNMOs. OIOS noted cases where belligerents would try to confuse peacekeeping units through disinformation in order to gain tactical or material advantages. In the absence of an effective communication system, both the UNMOs and the armed contingents could be rendered ineffective. Other equally important elements include the building of trust among officers and subordinates; the ability of the commander to communicate the mission and the concept of operations to all participating armed units and UNMOs; and the clarity of orders and instructions to generate consistent and coordinated action.

46. OIOS observed that UNMOs have access to groups and to sources within communities who are prepared to discuss matters with them that they would not ordinarily discuss with the armed elements of the Force. Some commanders in the Force therefore regard the success of the UNMOs as a challenge to their authority. In one example, a Force element disrupted the UNMO management of the disarmament process at a key point in the operation, which caused it to be temporarily halted and left for days in a precarious hiatus.

47. Effective cooperation and coordination of military elements are as much a matter of command and control as actual operational command. For effective cooperation to occur, the following conditions must be established:

- reliable information reporting structure and comprehensive communications plan;
- mutual awareness of the tasks of other elements and how each contributes to the overall mission objective;
- joint planning and training in areas requiring mutual support and cooperation;
- regular liaison and briefings on the activities of each element.

48. UNMO cooperation and coordination with civilians involves three key civilian groups, namely, the civilian component of the mission, civilian organizations and agencies in the mission area, and local conflicting parties and population. OIOS believes that, for the first two, the fundamentals of cooperation and coordination are:

- integrating civil dimensions into military planning and joint training;
- effective exchange of information;
- identifying the military support and cooperation required by various agencies; and
- establishing working groups, generating dialogue and maintaining liaison at all levels.

49. To promote effective UNMO cooperation and coordination with the local conflicting parties and population, the key elements include:

- having a professional knowledge and familiarity with local language, laws and customs;
- adequate interpretation/translation facilities available to UNMOs;
- meeting constantly — interaction reduces misunderstandings and builds mutual confidence and acceptance; and
- continuously briefing all those working together, so that differences are discussed before they become problems.

VIII. Exit strategy

50. Since UNMOs play a significant role in the end phases of the mission by continuing to monitor and observe in order to ensure the sustainability of the peace process, it is imperative that each mission should have an exit strategy for UNMOs that builds on benchmarks established at the outset of the mission. The exit strategies should be linked with the post-peacekeeping phase, with UNMOs assigned to assist in peacebuilding efforts to ensure long-term stability by helping to dispel the lingering mistrust among former belligerents. The exit strategy for UNMOs should, therefore, be derived from a thorough assessment of the potential challenges to the sustainability of the peace, rather than be dictated by a mechanical drawdown of the mission's strength.

51. OIOS believes that in developing the exit strategy, the costs and risks associated with the envisaged withdrawal should be assessed against the costs and risks of redeployment, should the peace process collapse prematurely. Such determination should take into account the extent to which the presence of the UNMOs could be perceived to imply that any of former belligerents are not trusted or, worse, that the United Nations is privy to some information about the imminent outbreak of hostilities that it is not sharing. If it is decided to extend the UNMO presence beyond the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, the UNMOs to be retained should be selected on the basis of the fresh requirements and may even require additional training for operating in a new environment.

IX. Use of advanced technology

52. The availability of sophisticated new technology could be a key element in increasing credibility and enhancing operational effectiveness of UNMOs. Apart from improved military surveillance capabilities of the national troop contingents, such as night vision and better communications, there is insufficient recognition of the importance of other technology. Technology needs to be considered as a force multiplier and not as a substitute for good military judgment and operating techniques.

53. OIOS noted that over 90 per cent of UNMOs believed that the use of advanced technology such as night vision equipment, GPS and tracking technology for locating vehicles and hostages could improve their operational effectiveness. Most deemed new technology as essential for mobility, analysis and planning capacity, situational awareness and security. Surprisingly, however, the most urgent requirement projected in the field was for such basic equipment as binoculars,

prismatic compasses and radio communication. The more sophisticated technology reflected in UNMO responses includes the following:

- satellite imagery and ground sensors linked to monitoring centres, which could help to reduce the number of UNMOs;
- information technology, including tools for data analysis;
- use of GPS to pinpoint objects of observation and violation more accurately;
- electronic communications, including the Internet, e-mail and mobile telephony;
- hand-held devices for detecting and monitoring landmines, unexploded ordnance and chemical and biological warfare agents.

54. OIOS recognizes existing problems in deploying and using advanced monitoring and observation technologies. First, it is expensive, although the cost of new technology often declines rapidly, once it becomes widely available. Secondly, expert training would be required to allow personnel to use the advanced technology, especially since UNMOs are drawn from a wide variety of countries and military backgrounds. Thirdly, advanced technology may produce information overload, overwhelming the capacity of missions in the field to effectively and successfully use the information that becomes available. The missions may therefore have a further requirement to invest in data-processing and analytical capabilities.

55. OIOS believes that there is a need for well-planned incremental measures for technology insertion, aimed at optimum results in the multinational environment of peacekeeping. For purposes of compatibility and optimum resource utilization, DPKO should ensure that any advanced technology introduced to UNMOs is sourced from equipment stocks in the mission before procuring it in the open market. In addition, as conceded by DPKO, there is a need to address the challenges associated with training, interoperability and affordability. Acknowledging the importance of advanced technology, DPKO supports a phased insertion, so that Member States can prepare and train their officers, and considers such high-tech equipment only where a demonstrable need exists and this can be done within financial constraints. Based on the OIOS review, the Military Division of DPKO intends to examine the use of advanced technology in peacekeeping missions, with a view to improving conditions for missions and deployed personnel.

56. Based on the inputs from the staff, field commanders and UNMOs, and taking into account the current requirements, OIOS recommends adopting the following technologies in the medium term:

(a) GPS technology;

(b) tracking system to pinpoint the location of UNMOs taken hostage and hijacked vehicles;

(c) night-vision goggles and similar technology;

(d) mine detection and unexploded ordnance detection devices;

(e) advanced communications technology; and

(f) increased use of helicopters for mobility.

X. Individual performance appraisal

57. OIOS was satisfied that individual performance appraisals of UNMOs are conducted in all the missions. However, there is no standard system regarding the timing and frequency of performance reports, and it appeared that none of the UNMOs, including senior UNMOs, were quite sure about the distribution process after the performance appraisal reports were completed. In some instances, no appraisals were made until the very end of the UNMO tour, when they would be hastily prepared based on incomplete information.

58. OIOS believes that the following procedure should be established:

- team leaders should make interim performance reports for their UNMOs every three months and submit them to the UNMO sector headquarters.
- on completion of a tour or upon rotation, the senior UNMO should compile the final performance report based on the interim reports in the UNMO's personal file and after his/her review, submits it to the UNMO cell in Force Headquarters.
- senior UNMO or CMO should endorse the final report and have the appraised UNMO comment on and sign the report.
- performance reports for all UNMOs irrespective of rank should then be forwarded to DPKO for onward transmission to the UNMO's country through its Permanent Mission.
- copy of the final report should be filed in the DPKO/UNMO database for future reference.

XI. Backstopping by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

59. OIOS observed that the Military Division was very responsive to military observer issues, which are handled by desk officers for the respective missions. However, there is a need to strengthen coordination and liaison with troop-contributing countries in regard to the standards for UNMO training and modalities for their deployment and repatriation. Equally important is to promote best practices and incorporate them into the UNMO resource material. OIOS noted that these functions are not clearly assigned to any of the four services making up the Military Division.

60. OIOS believes that UNMO debriefing reports provided at the end of their tours of duty provide valuable material for understanding emerging problems and challenges, and for discerning best practices. OIOS found that, so far, the majority of UNMOs were not involved in any lessons-learned exercises, nor did they receive any material such as a lessons-learned compendium or database on best practices. Such summaries of best practices and lessons learned could be provided online either by DPKO's Best Practices Unit or the Military Division.

61. OIOS is of the view that the main reason for the fact that these issues are not coordinated in a structured manner is because there is no single point of contact in DPKO that could be responsible for UNMO issues. Such coordination could be

achieved by establishing a focal point in the Military Adviser's office for UNMO policy issues, including security, administration, liaison and training.

XII. Conclusions

62. The role of UNMOs in providing timely and essential military information and analyses for multidimensional peacekeeping needs remains crucial, as is their support to many non-military aspects of the mission. OIOS found that there has been a continuous search in the field for an optimal configuration of reporting lines for such information and analyses, and for command and coordination arrangements. While improvements in command and control will undoubtedly have a positive impact on UNMO effectiveness, it should also be enhanced by strengthening UNMO cooperation and coordination with other mission elements, developing proper exit strategies, and equipping UNMOs with state of the art technology and facilitating exchange of best practices.

XIII. Recommendations

63. DPKO stated that it considers the review by OIOS to be useful and timely, as it was made at a time when the Department's policy on UNMOs was being updated, and as such, provided an additional source upon which current practices and procedures could be measured and assessed. OIOS considers the following recommendations crucial for improving the overall operational effectiveness of UNMOs in peacekeeping operations.

64. DPKO should develop a more generic and streamlined command and control structure for its peacekeeping missions with UNMOs and armed contingents. That structure should allow effective integration of UNMOs at the Force Headquarters level through a single unified chain of command, while maintaining operational independence at sector and lower levels (paras. 15-17) (SP-04-001-001).**

65. DPKO should develop: a mechanism to ensure that UNMOs attend a recognized military observers' course at a national peacekeeping training centre prior to deployment, and that they are provided with a certificate and course report detailing the training and proficiencies attained (para. 24); a system to help identify troop-contributing countries that provide UNMOs who are consistently poor performers and recommend steps that they can take to improve standards and ensure compliance (para. 25); and encourage greater participation of female UNMOs in peacekeeping missions (para. 28) (SP-04-001-002).

66. DPKO should: explore the use of a standby roster for improving its initial deployment of UNMOs in combination with the PMSTAR software package and rotation cell system by applying the experiences and lessons learned by the Civilian Police Division (para. 29); develop a system for staggering arrival, rotation and repatriation of UNMOs; and streamline the induction and checkout procedures (paras. 32-33) (SP-04-001-003).

67. DPKO should develop a comprehensive security plan for UNMOs to help ensure that: UNMOs always operate within range of the VHF/HF communications

** An internal code used by OIOS for recording recommendations.

systems of the armed contingents and are provided with armed escorts, when necessary (paras. 35-36); armed contingents maintain a quick reaction team, with ground-to-air communications as standby in each sector for response to emergency extraction/evacuation situations (para. 37); mission directives emphasize that the responsibility for the security of UNMOs rests with the armed contingents (paras. 37-38); and UNMOs are provided with a distinct identity to distinguish them from armed contingents in order to emphasize their unarmed status (para. 41) (SP-04-001-004).

68. DPKO should ensure that mission plans include an effective information reporting structure and a comprehensive communications plan to facilitate effective integration of UNMOs with other mission components (para. 43) (SP-04-001-005).

69. DPKO should ensure that proficient translators/interpreters are made available to UNMO teams that have a requirement for such services (para. 49) (SP-04-001-006).

70. DPKO should ensure that each mission has an exit strategy for UNMOs that builds on established benchmarks and links with the post-peacekeeping phase (paras. 50-51) (SP-04-001-007).

71. DPKO should examine availability and incrementally adopt such advanced technology tools for UNMOs as appropriate (para. 56) (SP-04-001-008).

72. DPKO should review the procedures for UNMO performance appraisals and ensure consistent adherence by missions (para. 58) (SP-04-001-009).

73. DPKO should ensure that the experience of UNMOs is summarized, analysed and made available online in the form of a compendium of best practices (para. 60) (SP-04-001-010).

74. DPKO should establish a focal point in the Military Adviser's office for UNMO policy issues (para. 61) (SP-04-001-011).

(*Signed*) Dileep **Nair**
Under-Secretary-General
for Internal Oversight Services

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Follow-up to the outcome of the twenty-sixth special session: implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS

Progress made in the implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 58/236 of 23 December 2003, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive and analytical report on progress achieved in realizing the commitments set out in the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS adopted by the General Assembly on 27 June 2001. The report draws on a broad range of data sources, including national data on key AIDS indicators from 17 countries and territories in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Eastern Europe,[1] other national surveys, commissioned studies and evidence-based estimates of coverage for key AIDS interventions. It tracks the current state of the epidemic and summarizes overall progress made in realizing the commitments set out in the Declaration, with a special focus on those set out for 2005.

Despite encouraging signs that the epidemic is beginning to be contained in a small but growing number of countries, the overall epidemic continues to expand, with much of the world at risk of falling short of the targets set forth in the Declaration. Similarly, while the expansion of AIDS treatment programmes has brought fresh hope to communities and re-energized community-based prevention and care efforts, the roll out of treatment programmes has been insufficient to avoid a deepening of the impact of the epidemic on some of the world's most vulnerable households, communities and countries. AIDS-related mortality continues to erode the fragile base of human capital on which sound development depends and threatens to undermine critical social institutions in hard-hit countries. The consensus that

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AIDS is an exceptional problem that warrants an exceptional response holds forth the promise that the global response to AIDS will at last match the epidemic in its scale and complexity.

In 2006, a comprehensive report will be released using end-of-year data and with expanded information on all global and country indicators.

I. Introduction

1. Since 2001, there has been a dramatic change in global action to combat AIDS. Political commitment to the fight against AIDS, sorely lacking in the early stages of the epidemic, has markedly increased at the national, regional and global levels. In the two most populous countries in the world, leadership initiatives are having a significant impact. In China, senior political leaders have begun to speak publicly about AIDS issues, while in India, the national AIDS Council — chaired by the Prime Minister — has been established, with the representation of various sectoral ministries. The response to AIDS in the Caribbean is being transformed by the leadership and collaboration of the region's political leaders, under the umbrella of the Pan Caribbean Partnership Against HIV/AIDS. The countries of Europe have pledged to ensure universal access to treatment and care by 2005 throughout Europe and Central Asia. In East Africa, early and visible political leadership is beginning to bear fruit by way of encouraging signs of early declines in HIV prevalence. In several countries in Latin America, AIDS mortality has declined since the expansion of antiretroviral treatment programmes. Donor countries are actively exploring sustainable, innovative mechanisms to finance programmes for AIDS and international development. In all regions and countries, people living with HIV continue to lead efforts to overcome the silence surrounding AIDS and to demand effective action to address the epidemic.

2. While the intensity and reach of HIV prevention programmes remain insufficient, more countries are working to apply the lessons learned at the scale and intensity needed to have an impact on the epidemic. As prevention coverage increases, some countries are making gains in alleviating the toll of the epidemic among young people. In Cambodia, HIV prevalence among sex workers and their customers has sharply declined since 1998. In the Bahamas, an expanded approach to prevention and treatment has led to decreases in HIV prevalence and AIDS mortality over the past seven years. Financial resources available in 2005 for AIDS programmes in low- and middle-income countries will most likely be nearly six times greater than amounts spent worldwide in 2001. Access to life-preserving antiretroviral therapy in low-income settings, barely imaginable at the beginning of the current decade, is fast becoming a reality in many parts of the world. For the first time, truly comprehensive responses to AIDS, including HIV prevention and treatment, are emerging.

3. The Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (General Assembly resolution S-26/2, annex) has served as a critical mechanism for advocacy, transparency and accountability in the global fight against the epidemic. The Declaration establishes clear time-bound targets that underpin the Millennium Development Goals, especially Goal 6, "To have, by 2015, halted, and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS ..."[2] Civil society is playing an increasingly valuable role in monitoring the fulfilment of these commitments.

4. Notwithstanding these and other advances in the global fight, the epidemic continues to expand. Compared to previous years, there were more new infections (4.9 million) and more AIDS deaths (3.1 million) in 2004. More than 8,000 people die every day from AIDS-related conditions. As at December 2004, an estimated 39.4 million people were living with HIV. Women now account for just under one half of all people living with HIV. This increasing feminization of the epidemic reflects the paradoxical situation facing women and girls: they face heightened

vulnerability to HIV infection, despite being less likely to engage in high-risk behaviour than their male partners. In addition, the epidemic continues disproportionately to affect adolescents and young adults with one half of the new infections occurring among this age group. An estimated 2.3 million children under 15 years of age are living with HIV, the vast majority of them infants who contracted HIV during gestation or delivery or as a result of breastfeeding.

5. The impact on children is staggering. Globally, AIDS now accounts for 3 per cent of deaths in children under 5 years of age, but in hard-hit countries, this figure may be as high as 50 per cent. Fifteen million children have been orphaned by AIDS and the number is expected to increase sharply in coming years. Millions of other children are living in households in which an adult is sick.

6. Worldwide, 1 in every 90 adults (ages 15-49 years) in low- and middle-income countries is living with HIV, representing 95 per cent of the world's HIV infections. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the hardest-hit region, accounting for 64 per cent of the world's HIV infections and for 74 per cent of all AIDS deaths in 2004. The apparent stabilization of the epidemic in some African countries is, however, occurring at an unacceptably high level and signifies that the number of AIDS deaths is now being matched by a comparable number of new infections. The epidemic has yet to display a natural saturation point. In Swaziland, the country most affected, adult prevalence continues to climb, with 42.6 per cent of pregnant women testing HIV-positive in 2004.

7. Outside Africa, HIV prevalence is highest in the Caribbean (2.3 per cent). As at December 2004, an estimated 7.1 million people in South and South-East Asia were living with HIV, including 890,000 who became infected in that year. At the end of 2004, there were nine times more people living with HIV in Eastern Europe and Central Asia than 10 years earlier. In Latin America, more than 1.7 million people are living with HIV. In 2004, the epidemic expanded in every region, including North America and Western Europe, where early prevention successes have given way in recent years to increases in sexual risk behaviour. In all regions, the epidemic disproportionately targets the most marginalized populations, such as sex workers, men who have sex with men, injecting drug users, street youth and prisoners.

8. The toll of the epidemic on women and girls has significantly intensified, largely as a consequence of the low social, economic and legal status of women in many countries. Among young people (ages 15 to 24 years) in sub-Saharan Africa, there are 36 women living with HIV for every 10 HIV-infected males. Even in regions in which men are more likely to be infected than women, the number of women living with HIV is rapidly increasing: by 56 per cent in East Asia between 2002 and 2004, and by 48 per cent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In addition to their high vulnerability to HIV, women and girls also shoulder a disproportionate share of AIDS-related care and support burdens.

9. Despite encouraging increases in AIDS spending in recent years, it remains difficult to transform promising local projects into broad-based programmes that have sufficient coverage to influence the course of the epidemic. Owing in large measure to the failure to adopt comprehensive approaches, the rate of new HIV infections and AIDS deaths is accelerating, with especially disturbing signs of growth of the epidemic in Asia, where one half of the world's population lives.

Worsening impact of AIDS

10. Although expanding treatment programmes offer hope, it is possible that 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa will by 2006 have lost more than one tenth of their labour force to AIDS. In what may be an early glimpse of the epidemic's long-term capacity for broad-based damage, the effect of AIDS on agricultural sectors played a pivotal role in the recent food crisis in Southern Africa. The consequences of the epidemic are not confined to Africa: studies by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Asian Development Bank estimate that AIDS will slow the rate of poverty reduction in Cambodia by an average of 60 per cent between 2003 and 2015.

11. The most damaging aspect of the epidemic may be its tendency to sever the generational ties on which societies depend for the transmission of values, cultural norms and practical know-how. By targeting young, working-age adults, AIDS unleashes a chain of events that threatens to cause entire societies to unravel. In short, AIDS is an exceptional problem which demands an exceptional response.

II. Key findings

12. Reaching the targets set out in the Declaration of Commitment and the Millennium Development Goals requires a comprehensive response in both scope and coverage. Unknown to the world less than 25 years ago, AIDS represents a unique threat to international development, which undermines the hope of achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

Rate of new infections

13. **Many of the most affected countries are at risk of falling short of the target of reducing by 2005 the level of infection in young men and women aged 15 to 24.** While some countries are experiencing a degree of success in reducing infection levels in certain populations, the pace of the epidemic's expansion throughout the world is accelerating. Although proven strategies exist to prevent new HIV infections, essential prevention strategies reach only a fraction of those who need them. Delivery of life-saving prevention services is especially vital for young people, who represent one half of all new infections, and for marginalized and vulnerable populations.

Expanding access to treatment

14. **While the number of people on antiretroviral therapy increased by nearly two thirds during the second half of 2004, in low- and middle-income countries only 12 per cent of those who need antiretroviral therapy were receiving it as at December 2004.** The "3 by 5" campaign,[3] launched by the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNAIDS in December 2003, has galvanized substantially stronger commitment to scaling up access to treatment. Treatment — once considered unfeasible in settings in which resources are limited — now presents an unprecedented opportunity to develop comprehensive national responses to

HIV/AIDS in which care and prevention and impact mitigation efforts are delivered in a comprehensive and mutually reinforcing manner.

Human rights and AIDS

15. **While many surveys of national AIDS responses and policies reveal the existence of human rights safeguards, such measures frequently lack the specificity and enforcement mechanisms necessary to combat the associated stigma and gender-based discrimination.** Many countries have yet to adopt legislation that will prevent discrimination against people living with HIV, and even fewer have enacted measures to promote and protect the human rights of vulnerable populations.

Orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS

16. **Most high-prevalence countries are making considerable efforts to protect children orphaned or made vulnerable by the epidemic but available evidence indicates that national efforts and the level of donor support are currently not sufficient to address this growing crisis.**

Building sustainable capacity

17. **A major barrier to the implementation and expansion of essential AIDS programmes is the acute shortage of trained personnel who possess requisite skills and expertise.** The strategies exist to preserve and build national capacity, including maximizing use of community resources, but donors and recipient countries have often failed to integrate such approaches into programmatic efforts.

Increasing but still inadequate financial resources

18. **If current spending trends continue, by 2007 there will be a significant shortfall between the funds available and the resources needed to finance a response that is comprehensive in both scope and coverage.** Further details are provided in section VII below. The impact of resources at the country level will be maximized by strong national ownership of the response, the harmonization of efforts and the establishment of appropriate institutional and administrative frameworks, objectives that underpin the "Three Ones" initiative,[4] which has been embraced by diverse stakeholders throughout the world.

III. Prevention

19. The Declaration of Commitment identifies HIV prevention as the mainstay of the AIDS response, reflecting the global commitment to implementing comprehensive, evidence-based programmes for the prevention of new infections. The pace of new infections is accelerating, and expanded coverage of prevention programmes is imperative. Effective prevention is especially critical to sustaining global efforts to expand access to treatment in resource-limited settings. Similarly,

the expansion of treatment and care will reinforce the effectiveness and scope of prevention interventions.

20. In accordance with the Declaration, 90 per cent of young people aged 15 to 24 should have access by 2005 to the information, education and services needed to protect themselves from infection. By the end of 2005, HIV prevalence among young men and women (ages 15 to 24) in the most affected countries should be 25 per cent lower than in 2001, and the proportion of infants infected with HIV should have fallen by 20 per cent. The Declaration also envisaged a significant strengthening of the HIV/AIDS response in the world of work, the implementation of strategies to prevent HIV transmission among migrants and mobile workers, and the adoption of a broad range of initiatives to reduce the vulnerability of young people and other highly vulnerable populations.

21. Much more is known today on how to prevent HIV transmission. Effective HIV prevention incorporates a combination of approaches, including the provision of life-saving information, promotion of abstinence and fidelity, forging of new social norms, building of the skills and motivation of individuals to protect themselves from infection, and creation of the social and physical environments that encourage risk reduction. Strong prevention programmes also combat the stigma associated with AIDS and work to reduce the root causes of heightened vulnerability to infection. Interventions that deviate from this comprehensive model by placing undue emphasis on certain strategies to the exclusion of others, remain largely unproven. In all countries that have reversed the spread of national epidemics, prevention programmes have benefited from the vocal and sustained support of national political leaders.

22. Worldwide, the number of people receiving counselling and testing services has doubled since 2001, the number of women offered services to prevent mother-to-child transmission has increased by 70 per cent, and the number of young people who have received AIDS education has doubled.

23. Such encouraging trends, unfortunately, represent the exception rather than the rule. Most countries have yet to embark on a concerted effort to address the factors that increase vulnerability to infection. Even for programmes targeted at the most vulnerable or those supporting interventions with long-standing evidence of effectiveness, coverage is minimal. Worldwide, targeted prevention services in 2003 reached only 16 per cent of sex workers, 11 per cent of men who have sex with men, 53 per cent of prisoners, 20 per cent of street children and less than 5 per cent of the world's 13.2 million injecting drug users. Less than 0.4 per cent of adults in low- and middle-income countries received voluntary counselling and testing services in 2003. Relatively little has been invested in evidence-based initiatives to prevent young people from using drugs or in services that help individuals to recover from drug use.

24. Globally, services to prevent mother-to-child transmission reach only 8 per cent of pregnant women, including just 5 per cent of pregnant women in Africa which has cumulatively accounted for 90 per cent of all children born with HIV. Global efforts to reduce the number of infants born with HIV infection continue to suffer from the limited access of women to primary HIV prevention and health services. Promoting women's access to antiretroviral therapy for their own health — and providing food, nutritional services and other basic benefits — can help to

increase their participation in services to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission and improve medical outcomes for both mothers and newborn.

25. In recent years, progress has been made in regard to the implementation of a comprehensive response to AIDS in the world of work as a growing number of stakeholders embrace the International Labour Organization Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work.[5] The proportion of firms in high-prevalence countries that have adopted HIV/AIDS policies has increased by 75 per cent in the past year. The Global Business Coalition has encouraged business leaders to influence change at the global policy level and to address stigma among workers. The International Organisation of Employers and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions have taken action, separately and together, to strengthen the workplace response, including the issuance of a joint pledge of collaborative and intensified action to combat AIDS.

26. Stronger efforts are required to achieve the goal of ensuring comprehensive prevention services for mobile populations. In 2003, less than one half of countries had strategies in place to promote HIV prevention for cross-border migrants but efforts are under way to address AIDS among mobile populations. In India, where a recent survey found that 16 per cent of truck drivers working a route in the southern part of the country were HIV-positive, the Avahan AIDS initiative is implementing HIV prevention programmes at 50 key truck stops. The World Food Programme is working to ensure that its contracted food transporters receive comprehensive HIV prevention services.

27. Many Governments have failed to prioritize prevention initiatives that target the populations at greatest risk of infection, which remain stigmatized. A 2004 survey of national AIDS spending in 26 countries found that some countries preferred to direct their limited prevention resources towards less effective initiatives that focus on the general population and people at low risk. This approach misses the critical opportunity to prevent an epidemic that is concentrated in the most vulnerable populations from spreading to the population at large.

Capitalizing on increased access to treatment in order to strengthen HIV prevention

28. Increased access to treatment offers a unique opportunity to strengthen HIV prevention efforts. Access to antiretroviral therapy increases the incentive to be tested for HIV, helps to reduce the stigma associated with AIDS and attracts individuals to health-care settings in which prevention messages can be delivered and reinforced. To capitalize on these opportunities, national programmes and donors should emphasize the delivery of prevention services in clinical settings, the creation of community-based prevention programmes delivered by and for people living with HIV (incorporating, where feasible and appropriate, the delivery of other essential services, such as nutritional support) and the adoption of treatment literacy initiatives to promote broad community understanding of the benefits and limitations of the available therapies.

Promoting effective prevention for women, girls and young people

29. Substantially stronger efforts are required to combat the increasing burden that the epidemic places on women and girls. Not only are women three to four times more physiologically susceptible than men to infection during sexual intercourse, they also confront a host of economic, social and legal factors that increase their vulnerability to infection, as discussed in paragraphs 56 to 61 below.

30. Increasing the access of women, girls and their sexual partners to timely, high-quality health services represents an important prevention priority. Such services can enhance women's access to information and education, address barriers to condom use and other forms of risk reduction, promote women's knowledge of their HIV status, facilitate the effective management of sexually transmitted diseases and serve as a gateway to services to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. In 2004, the United Nations Population Fund spearheaded the development and broad endorsement of the New York Call to Commitment, which articulates a comprehensive framework to maximize the use of sexual and reproductive health services to strengthen the global AIDS response.

31. Achievement of the prevention targets set out in the Declaration will require greater success in reaching young people with essential information, education and services. Although knowledge levels among young people have improved, more than one half of those surveyed in nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa lacked comprehensive information about HIV prevention. In Indonesia, 6 per cent of young men (ages 15 to 24) reported using a condom the first time they had sex, and less than one in six reported having used a condom during their most recent episode of sexual intercourse or when they most recently patronized a sex worker. Although an enormous body of data highlights effective strategies to reduce risk behaviour among young people, surveys consistently find that most of the world's young people lack meaningful access to youth-oriented prevention services.

Reducing the contribution of injecting drug abuse to new HIV infections

32. To wage a comprehensive fight against new HIV infections, there must be significantly increased access to programmes that address the role of injecting drug use in facilitating the spread of HIV. Key services include prevention of drug abuse, drug-dependent treatment (including substitution maintenance therapy) and access to sterile injection equipment. The obligation to eradicate illegal drug use among prisoners must be balanced against their right to health care, including measures proven to prevent the transmission of disease through drug use. To help build national capacity to curb the contribution of drug use to the epidemic, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is currently implementing technical assistance projects in a number of regions.

Developing new prevention tools

33. New prevention approaches are badly needed to buttress existing proven tools, especially those for women and girls who typically lack prevention strategies that they can independently control. Five microbicide candidates are now being tested in

large-scale human clinical trials, By promoting collaboration among researchers, the multi-stakeholder Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise seeks to bring renewed energy to the global search for a HIV vaccine. To expedite the initiation of clinical trials and accelerate the future introduction of new prevention technologies that prove to be effective, the European Union in 2004 approved new policies to assist developing countries, upon request, to undertake technical scientific reviews of new products intended primarily for use in developing countries.

Recommendations

34. **The following action is recommended in regard to HIV prevention:**

(a) **Scale up successful and proven prevention activities under the leadership of national authorities and with the collaboration of all stakeholders;**

(b) **Target prevention efforts to achieve maximum impact, especially in countries in which epidemics are concentrated among highly vulnerable populations;**

(c) **Ensure that, with the scaling up of treatment services, every opportunity is taken to enhance prevention;**

(d) **Increase the provision of prevention education and support for young people (both those who are in and out of school) and implement policies that address the heightened vulnerability of women and girls;**

(e) **Strengthen prevention activities in the world of work and initiatives that address migrant populations.**

IV. Treatment, care and support

35. The Declaration of Commitment recognizes AIDS treatment, care and support as fundamental elements of the global response. It provides that countries will develop and make significant progress in implementing comprehensive care strategies and in strengthening health systems in order to increase access to affordable medicines, diagnostics and related technologies, and to deliver the highest available standard of AIDS care, including antiretroviral therapy.

36. Since 2001, a strong consensus has emerged that providing treatment and care to people living with AIDS is a humanitarian and ethical imperative, resulting in the launch of the 3 by 5 initiative[3] by WHO and UNAIDS. This push to expand dramatically the availability of treatment has gained impetus through the convergence of several factors, including renewed political will and leadership, rapidly falling drug prices and the availability of financing. Achieving this goal and universal access in future years will require standardized treatment regimens, new training methods, the use of community health workers and more effective drug supply systems. Such approaches provide significant new opportunities to expand the scope of prevention interventions and to consolidate and strengthen ailing public health systems.

Expansion of access to treatment

37. All major donors recognize that AIDS programmes must comprehensively address prevention, treatment, care and support. More than 40 countries have developed a national treatment scale-up plan and over 30 countries have set ambitious treatment targets in line with the 3 by 5 initiative. As a result, access to antiretroviral therapy has increased significantly in all regions over the past two years, even in countries in which resources are severely limited. In low- and middle-income countries, the number of individuals receiving antiretroviral therapy increased from an estimated 400,000 in June 2004 to 700,000 by December 2004. In sub-Saharan Africa, utilization of antiretroviral therapy more than doubled in the second half of 2004 and the number of service delivery points greatly expanded. The number of people receiving treatment in Botswana, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia increased by more than 10,000 in each country over a six-month period. Botswana, Namibia and Uganda now provide antiretroviral therapy to more than one quarter of those who need it. Antiretroviral therapy coverage exceeds 50 per cent in seven countries in Latin America. In Asia, Thailand is initiating antiretroviral therapy for an additional 3,000 individuals each month, while access to antiretroviral therapy in Cambodia has increased tenfold since 2003.

38. In countries in which access to antiretroviral therapy is expanding, people with AIDS and their families are being rejuvenated. The survival rates of patients on antiretroviral therapy in low- and middle-income countries are 90 per cent one year after initiating treatment and approximately 80 per cent after two years. Brazil has reduced the AIDS mortality rate by approximately 80 per cent since 1996 by providing extensive access to antiretroviral therapy through the public sector. In high-income countries, in which access to antiretroviral therapy ranges from 70 per cent to more than 90 per cent, dramatic reductions in AIDS mortality and in the number of infants born with HIV have occurred.

39. The benefits of treatment extend beyond individuals and households, affecting society as a whole. In one South African township, for example, the number of local AIDS support groups has more than doubled since the introduction of treatment. The availability of AIDS treatment has increased AIDS awareness in the community, stimulated demand for HIV testing and helped to ease the stigmatization of people living with HIV.

> Despite having the lowest per capita income in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti, with support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, is making important strides in expanding access to antiretroviral therapy. By December 2004, tens of thousands of individuals had been counselled and tested, and 2,000 people in urban and central Haiti had been placed on antiretroviral therapy.

40. National plans to increase access to treatment have been assisted by the promulgation by WHO of antiretroviral therapy guidelines for resource-limited settings, the pre-qualification of antiretroviral therapy drugs, increased levels of technical support and its coordination of the AIDS Medicines and Diagnostic

Service, which provides support for the procurement and management of AIDS drugs and diagnostics.

41. The $15 billion President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief of the United States of America is providing significant new resources to national AIDS programmes, including access to treatment. As at January 2005, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria had approved funding that will ultimately support the delivery of antiretroviral therapy to an estimated 1.6 million people in resource-limited settings. The World Bank has also increased its support for antiretroviral therapy. The mobilization of the business sector and public-private partnerships is helping to provide comprehensive care and support.

Obstacles to accessing AIDS care and treatment

42. As many as 100,000 health and community workers must be trained to expand access to antiretroviral therapy throughout the world, an effort that is being supported through the adoption of innovative approaches, such as the WHO Integrated Management of Adult and Adolescent Illness modules. To facilitate early diagnosis, several countries have implemented policies which promote the routine offer of confidential HIV counselling and testing services.

43. While prices for antiretroviral treatment have substantially declined, the average annual $300 price tag for first-line antiretroviral regimens still inhibits broader access. Achieving and sustaining broad access to antiretroviral therapy will require further declines in the prices of both first- and second-line treatments and of diagnostic and monitoring technology, which remains prohibitively expensive in many parts of the world.

44. Although 15 per cent of those infected are children, less than 5 per cent of those on treatment are children. Diagnostic tests to identify HIV infection in children aged under 18 months are expensive, and paediatric formulations of antiretroviral drugs are scarce and more costly than adult medications.

45. To ensure that the benefits of currently available regimens are maximized, global efforts to minimize the development of drug resistance are important. Efforts include the sentinel surveillance of HIV drug resistance, the use of simplified regimens and fixed-dose combinations, and the provision of support in regard to patient education, counselling and adherence. Patient adherence and programme sustainability will also be supported through equitable and innovative approaches to financing that do not depend upon user fees at the point of service delivery.

Recommendations

46. **The following action is recommended in regard to treatment, care and support:**

(a) **Review national testing policies in order to encourage more widespread knowledge of serostatus, and increase donor financial support for testing initiatives;**

(b) **Take global action to lower further the price and accessibility of first- and second-line antiretroviral therapy regimens, including the current high-priced and often unavailable antiretroviral therapy regimens for children;**

(c) **With the assistance of donors and technical agencies, strengthen systems to monitor equitable access to treatment for women, girls and vulnerable populations, including through the provision of disaggregated data by sex;**

(d) **Integrate HIV prevention, home-based care, psychosocial services, treatment support, treatment of opportunistic infections and food and nutritional support with antiretroviral therapy as components of comprehensive AIDS care;**

(e) **Maximize the use of community workers and paraprofessionals in delivering and/or monitoring antiretroviral therapy and in promoting treatment adherence in order to accelerate the scaling up of treatment services.**

V. Orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS

47. In accordance with the Declaration of Commitment, by 2005 countries are required to implement national policies and strategies to build and strengthen governmental, family and community capacities to provide a supportive environment for orphans[6] and girls and boys infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. This includes the provision of counselling and psychosocial support, and ensuring their access to education, health support, shelter and nutrition on an equal basis with other children. The Declaration also provides that countries will take steps to protect orphans and vulnerable children from abuse, violence, exploitation, discrimination, trafficking and loss of inheritance.

48. Globally, 15 million children have been orphaned by AIDS, a number expected to increase sharply in the coming years. AIDS is primarily responsible for the dramatic growth in the number of orphans in sub-Saharan Africa, which increased by more than one third between 1990 and 2003. Twelve million children in Africa have lost one or both parents to the disease, while millions live in households in which an adult is sick.

Strengthening families and communities

49. The United Nations Children's Fund has spearheaded the development of the comprehensive *Framework for the Protection, Care and Support of Orphans and Vulnerable Children Living in a World with HIV and AIDS*[7] which identifies tools to guide national action. Priority programmatic responses to protect children include access to antiretroviral therapy in order to keep one or both parents alive and healthy, initiatives to enhance the food and economic security of AIDS-affected families and community-based vocational education initiatives for affected children.

50 Data on school attendance suggest that many countries are making progress in preserving the educational opportunities of children affected by AIDS. While school attendance has historically been much lower for orphans than for non-orphaned children, household surveys undertaken between 2001 and 2003 in nine African

countries indicate that the rate of attendance of orphans now approaches parity with non-orphans. Ensuring access to education is paramount, underscoring the potential of universal education programmes, the elimination of school fees, and the provision of in-school meals to alleviate the long-term impact of the epidemic on young people.

51. Other effective efforts include the adoption of policy and legislative initiatives to protect children from harm and abuse, ensuring the access of children to essential services, action to raise public awareness and mobilize broad-based action by society at large, and the implementation of programmes to address the nutritional needs of households and communities. These and other strategies aim to strengthen the capacity of families to protect and care for AIDS-affected children. A 2004 survey of countries in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that one third have enacted laws to support orphans and to protect them from abuse. However, only one country indicated that it possessed sufficient resources fully to enforce those laws.

> Rwanda, home to an estimated 160,000 children orphaned by AIDS, is making significant strides in addressing the impact of the epidemic on orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS and was among the first to enact comprehensive child-focused policies.

Recommendations

52. **The following recommendations are made in regard to orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS:**

(a) **Implement the Framework for the Protection, Care and Support of Orphans and Vulnerable Children Living in a World with HIV and AIDS by taking urgent steps to develop and operationalize action plans for each of the key tools of the Framework;**

(b) **Accelerate efforts to abolish school fees, increase the coverage of school meal programmes and remove other barriers for orphans and children made vulnerable by HIV and AIDS;**

(c) **Establish and monitor national treatment targets for HIV-infected children.**

VI. Human rights and gender equality

53. Discrimination, stigma and gender inequalities continue to fuel the spread of HIV. The Declaration of Commitment recognizes that the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all is essential to reducing vulnerability to infection. In accordance with the Declaration, all countries should have in place, and enforce meaningful protections against, HIV-based discrimination and prohibit discrimination against populations vulnerable to HIV infection. The Declaration also calls for, by 2005, the development and accelerated implementation of national strategies for women's empowerment, the advancement of women and the promotion and protection of their full enjoyment of all human rights, and the

implementation of measures to increase capacities of women and adolescent girls to protect themselves from the risk of HIV infection.

Ensuring the full participation of people living with HIV

54. In all countries that have reversed their national epidemics, a common element of the national response has been a strong commitment to human rights and non-discrimination and the active engagement of people living with HIV. Unfortunately, in many countries, the stigma associated with AIDS perpetuates a climate of silence and denial that discourages people living with HIV from disclosing their status, especially in the workplace. Nearly one half of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and nearly 40 per cent worldwide, had by 2003 yet to adopt legislation to prevent discrimination against persons living with HIV and AIDS. Even fewer countries have enacted laws to protect vulnerable populations from discrimination, including displaced populations and refugees.

55. Violations of rights hamper access to prevention, treatment and support services for the marginalized groups that are particularly vulnerable to infection, including injecting drug users, sex workers and men who have sex with men. Displaced populations, in particular women and children affected by conflict, emergencies or trafficking, confront extraordinary stigma and often face sexual violence, exploitation and separation from support services. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which became a UNAIDS co-sponsor in 2004, has significantly increased its capacity to identify, report and respond to HIV-related human rights violations against refugees or other displaced people.

Growing vulnerability of women

56. Notwithstanding their low-risk behaviour, women and girls are increasingly vulnerable to HIV infection as a result of their low status and their profound economic dependence on men. Surveys of young people in sub-Saharan Africa have consistently found that young women are less likely than young men to have comprehensive knowledge of HIV prevention, indicative of the limited educational opportunities for girls.

57. In many countries, married women have insufficiently recognized property or inheritance rights. Upon divorce or a husband's death, women are often left destitute, frequently with children for whom they must care. Lacking economic independence and an equal say in relationships, women and girls are often powerless to protect themselves from HIV infection because the tools at their disposal — faithfulness, male condoms and abstinence — typically require the cooperation of their male sexual partners.

58. Even in stable relationships, women may be at risk owing to their partner's HIV serostatus and the engagement of the latter in high-risk behaviour outside marriage. For example, while married women who marry young are less likely than their non-married counterparts to have multiple partners, studies in Kenya and Zambia indicate that married men are roughly three times more likely to be infected with HIV than the young partners of single young women.

59. Another extreme manifestation of gender inequality is violence against women. Between 30 and 60 per cent of women surveyed in 10 countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, South America and Europe report having experienced physical or sexual violence involving an intimate partner. Between 20 and 48 per cent of girls and young women aged 10 to 25 years, report that their first experience was coerced. This coercion increases women's risk of contracting HIV and their fear of negotiating the use of condoms.

60. With few economic options, women and girls are sometimes obliged to engage in transactional sex as a means of livelihood for themselves and their families. In many parts of the world, human trafficking networks force thousands of women and girls into sex work.

61. Women and girls also bear a disproportionate share of the burden of care for infected family members. A survey of three South African provinces found that almost three quarters of AIDS-affected households were headed by females, a significant proportion of whom were themselves battling AIDS-related illnesses. This burden of care is further aggravated by poverty, hunger and weak public services, with far-reaching health, social and economic consequences for women and girls. Women also bear a large burden in caring for orphaned children.

> Botswana has enacted legislation to enhance the status of women and girls (e.g., the Abolition of Marital Power Bill) giving married women an equal say in the disposal of family assets. A comprehensive system is also being developed to keep girls in school, reduce teenage pregnancy and integrate young mothers back into school following delivery.

Forging new cultural norms

62. The long-term fight to curb the spread of HIV also requires changes in the attitudes of men and boys, which can best occur if children are appropriately socialized at an early age. To implement such profound changes in cultural norms, unprecedented advocacy is needed. Since its formation in 2004, the Global Coalition on Women and AIDS has united diverse stakeholders in a common advocacy agenda to increase awareness of the impact of the epidemic on women and girls and to harness support for new cultural norms. Courageous advocates for gender equality are working in countries throughout the world, and their efforts merit strong financial and political support.

Recommendations

63. **The following action is recommended in regard to human rights and gender equality:**

(a) **Enact and implement meaningful laws to prohibit discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS and marginalized and displaced populations, and put in place and aggressively pursue enforcement mechanisms;**

(b) **Strengthen gender equality initiatives, take immediate steps to raise the status of women and girls, including by providing them with income-generating opportunities, and actively promote new social norms among men and boys;**

(c) **Enact national laws to ensure gender equality in property and inheritance rights;**

(d) **Undertake efforts to increase women's knowledge of their legal rights, combat violence against women and strengthen efforts to eradicate trafficking;**

(e) **Promote universal free education for girls and boys and school-based meal programmes.**

VII. Resources

64. On the basis of the evidence available in 2001, the Declaration of the Commitment called for the mobilization of annual expenditures of between $7 billion and $10 billion by 2005 for essential programmes in low- and middle-income countries and those countries experiencing or at risk of experiencing rapid expansion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Since then, the resources available from all sources, including national spending in low- and middle-income countries, have dramatically increased. It is estimated that $6.1 billion were available in 2004 to implement comprehensive programmes in 135 low- and middle-income countries, representing a 23 per cent increase over the estimated expenditures in 2003 and an increase of 20 times the amounts spent in 1996. Based on current trends and funding commitments, UNAIDS projects that the resources available to these countries will be close to $8 billion in 2005 and $10 billion by 2007, with the latter comprising $3 billion from domestic sources, $6.7 billion from international assistance and $364 million from foundations and non-governmental organizations.

65. National spending assessments indicate that affected countries have also substantially increased their AIDS-related expenditures through increased public allocations and higher out-of-pocket expenditure. Domestic spending on AIDS in 2007 is projected to be at least 20 per cent higher than in 2004, mainly owing to increased public expenditure in treatment and care, thereby offering some respite from the catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses that many individuals have borne thus far. Low- and middle-income countries, however, continue to lack the financial means to close the AIDS resource gap.

66. Donor countries have increased their bilateral and multilateral contributions for HIV/AIDS. It is estimated that bilateral resources available for AIDS may increase from $1.3 billion in 2004 to $2.3 billion in 2005, reaching an estimated $3.65 billion in 2007. Donor countries have also channelled additional resources through multilateral organizations, whose AIDS-related funding doubled from $1.5 billion to $3 billion between 2003 and 2005. Of particular note, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has committed more than $1.7 billion in additional resources for AIDS.

67. Although efforts to mobilize the resources called for in the Declaration appear to be on track, additional data-driven analyses undertaken since 2001 indicate that significantly increased resources will be required in future years to generate a

comprehensive response. In particular, financial investments and extensive technical support will be needed to enable resource-constrained countries to programme effectively the increased level of resources now being made available. If sufficient resources are to be mobilized to bring essential programmes to scale, initial projections by UNAIDS indicate that additional resources will be needed, with the bulk from the international community. Multiple studies are currently under way further to refine estimates and to develop a consensus on the global financial needs that will ensure a comprehensive response. It is expected that the revised estimates will be available by mid-2005.

Three Ones: making the money work

68. The quality of aid is just as important as the quantity. The likelihood that the gap between available and needed resources will grow underscores the importance of using the available resources as effectively as possible. Historically, the limited national capacity of many countries has been further sapped by the multiplicity of the funding requirements of the various donors, which also have often failed to ensure that their individual programmes support national strategic AIDS goals.

69. National leaders, donors and multilateral agencies have reached consensus over the past two years on a single strategy, known as the Three Ones,[4] for planning and monitoring activities at the country level, with the goals of optimizing coordination and reducing duplication of effort. A major priority in the near term will be to promote the adherence of all stakeholders to the Three Ones approach.

Building sustainable capacity

70. The effectiveness of future increases in spending for AIDS will depend in large part on the capacity of recipient countries to make effective use of such resources. In addition to the estimates of financial resources needed annually to finance a comprehensive programme, accompanying investments in capacity are essential for maximizing the effectiveness of available funds.

71. Many of the most affected countries also face a severe human resources crisis in health sectors, educational systems, public administration and private firms. Various countries are pursuing innovative strategies to strengthen the workforce, although donor support for such initiatives is presently inadequate. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is presently developing a global initiative on HIV/AIDS and education to mobilize greater support and additional resources for measures to preserve, build and sustain national capacity in educational sectors. The Southern Africa Capacity Initiative of the United Nations Development Programme seeks to assist countries in arresting the capacity erosion caused by AIDS and in advancing their development objectives.

72. In many countries, health sectors are currently too weak to provide the services that will be required by the scaling-up of the AIDS response, in particular as regards antiretroviral treatment. Reasons include lack of investment in health infrastructure, insufficient numbers of health professionals, and a reluctance by donors to finance operational costs, especially salaries.

73. Similar infrastructural weaknesses and constraints in capacity impede national efforts to monitor the epidemic, prevent new infections and support orphans and children made vulnerable by AIDS. The urgent human resources crisis requires unblocking the systemic barriers to developing stronger capacity in the health and other sectors, stemming the drain of skilled manpower from the public service into non-governmental organizations and the private sector and from the poor to the richer countries, and reducing the urban-rural bias in the provision of services.

74. Solutions to these problems include maximizing the use of community-based resources, expanding training programmes for professionals and paraprofessionals and, where appropriate, short-term deployment of trained staff from other countries. Adequate modes and levels of the involvement of ministries of finance, of planning, and civil service/public sector reforms must be identified and ensured.

75. During the Consultation on Human Resources for Health held in Oslo in February 2005, recommendations were made to develop a global action platform which could lead to more coherent and evidence-based policies and advocacy, especially as regards resource mobilization. In particular, there is a need to ensure that human resources are adequately incorporated as a major part of health sector planning.

> In response to the virtual absence prior to 2003 of antiretroviral treatment training programmes in Central and Eastern Europe, the German foundation Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit underwrote an international project to create a regional HIV knowledge hub in Ukraine, which was launched in 2004. With financial support from the Global Fund and the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, the knowledge hub in its first year trained 66 caregivers.

Spending on AIDS research

76. The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative estimates that between $624 million and $670 million was spent on AIDS vaccine in 2002, with the public sector accounting for 67 per cent of the expenditure. In 2004, an estimated $143 million was spent worldwide on microbicide, with the United States representing the single largest source of funding. Collaboration is under way to refine the estimates of future resource needs in this area.

Recommendations

77. **The following recommendations are made in regard to resources:**

(a) **Mobilize the financial resources needed from the international community to urgently provide full funding for an expanded, comprehensive response to the epidemic, based on the needs identified by UNAIDS and partners, including full funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as one of the major channels for financing this global effort;**

(b) **Narrow the expected shortfalls by securing the commitment of national leaders of low- and middle-income countries to increase, where possible, allocations to AIDS from domestic budgets;**

(c) **Develop and finance short- and long-term plans to build sustainable national capacity to mount a high-level response to the epidemic, as well as basic operating costs and infrastructural development;**

(d) **Simplify and further harmonize support to national AIDS responses in order to increase the impact on the AIDS epidemic and reduce the burden placed on the managerial and technical capacity of countries, and promote national ownership of the AIDS response by implementing the principles set forth in the Three Ones initiative;**

(e) **Strengthen reporting on the effectiveness of AIDS funding and programme implementation in order to ensure that policies and practices respond to and anticipate the evolving challenges of the AIDS epidemic.**

VIII. Monitoring and evaluation

78. Over the past two years, important steps have been taken to strengthen monitoring and evaluation efforts at the global and country levels. The UNAIDS secretariat and co-sponsors, together with the Global Fund, have refined indicators to measure the implementation of the Declaration, conducted or commissioned numerous surveys to gauge national responses, and provided extensive technical support to improve national information systems. They are also better able to estimate coverage for key interventions and to identify target coverage levels for specific interventions in different epidemic settings. Global capacity to monitor the flow of donor contributions has significantly improved over the past two years, as has the ability to estimate the total resources available for AIDS programmes in low- and middle-income countries. National epidemiological surveillance systems are also stronger, increasing the reliability of global, regional and country-level estimates regarding the epidemic.

79. Nevertheless, monitoring and evaluation efforts continue to suffer from important weaknesses that diminish the world's ability to detect, and rapidly respond to, emerging AIDS trends and issues. Owing in part to the difficulty of analysing AIDS-related expenditure by many donors, one cannot reliably categorize how the resources available in most countries are being spent (i.e., on prevention, treatment and care, orphan support etc.). Similarly, although ensuring equitable access to key services for women, girls, orphans and other children, young people and vulnerable populations is near the top of the global AIDS agenda, current monitoring and evaluation systems have little, if any, ability to disaggregate service utilization according to gender, age or social grouping.

Recommendations

80. **The following action is recommended in regard to monitoring and evaluation:**

(a) **Strengthen efforts to achieve a core national monitoring and evaluation system that provides high-quality data for analysing country performance in relation to the national AIDS action framework;**

(b) Increase investment in building monitoring and evaluation capacity at the global, regional and national levels;

(c) Disaggregate the service utilization data of monitoring and evaluation programmes by age, gender and social grouping in order to monitor and assess the equity and effectiveness of national investments in AIDS programmes;

(d) Categorize AIDS spending data according to funded activities, including prevention, treatment and care and orphan support.

IX. Conclusions

81. **While political commitment to the AIDS response has become significantly stronger since 2001, it remains inadequate in many countries in which the epidemic is emerging as a major problem. Strong and energetic leadership is especially vital in all countries in Asia and Eastern Europe, where the opportunity to prevent the epidemic from becoming generalized is quickly vanishing. Leadership is similarly critical in high-income countries in order to reinvigorate their prevention efforts and to close the gap between the available resources and those needed for the global fight against AIDS.**

82. **In 2006, the General Assembly will receive a comprehensive report on international progress in implementing the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, with special reference to the targets set for 2005. The approach of this important milestone in the global response should motivate leaders from all walks of life, especially political leaders, to redouble their efforts to contribute to an effective response. As the impact of the epidemic on our world becomes increasingly apparent, failure in our response to AIDS is a possibility too disturbing to contemplate, yet one that will surely occur if effective action is not taken.**

Notes

[1] Anguilla, Barbados, Botswana, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Jamaica, Montserrat, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine and Zambia.

[2] United Nations Millennium Declaration (General Assembly resolution 55/2), para. 19.

[3] To place 3 million people living with AIDS in developing countries and countries with economies in transition on antiretroviral treatment by 2005.

[4] Launched at a high-level meeting hosted by UNAIDS, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on 25 April 2004, the "Three Ones" principles promote: **One** agreed AIDS action framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners; **One** national AIDS coordinating authority with a broad-based multisectoral mandate; and **One** agreed country level monitoring and evaluation system.

[5] Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization in June 2001. For the text, see *An ILO code of practice on HIV/AIDS and the world of work* (International Labour Office, Geneva, 2001).

[6] An orphan is defined as a child under 18 years of age, who has had at least one parent die.

[7] United Nations Children's Fund, New York, July 2004.